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Abstract
This research examines the effects of democratization and political performance
on the functional distribution of income in Argentina and Brazil from the end of their
authoritarian periods to the present. The existing literature tends to focus on the impacts
of democratization and political performance on the economic growth of the country as a
whole or on changes to per capita income. This analysis focuses on the equality of
economic development in less developed countries because growth is not necessarily
distributed equally and poverty and inequality are both endemic to many less developed
countries and also negatively impact development as a whole as well as the consolidation
of democracy. To examine the effects of democratization and political performance on
the shape of economic development, this thesis utilizes the Polity IV index as a measure
of democracy, Relative Political Extraction as a proxy for political performance, and
labor’s share of national income as a measure of income inequality.
Theoretically, a more democratic regime should enact policies that allow for a
more equitable distribution of income because democratization increases popular
representation and makes the provision of public goods preferable to the provision of
private goods. Similarly, a regime with higher political capacity should be better
equipped to enact whatever policies and development strategies it chooses, thereby
reducing income inequality if the regime deems equitable development a priority.
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The main finding of this research is that political performance has had a
significant impact on the shape of economic development in Argentina and Brazil,
whereas the effect of democratization on the shape of development is less clear. A
stronger, more effectively performing government will be better able to deliver equitable
development regardless of its level of democracy than will a poorly performing
government of any type.
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Chapter - 1
Introduction
From 1974 through the 1980s there was an emergence of new democracies
throughout the world known as the Third Wave of democratization. Many of these
transitions occurred in poor or developing countries in the context of significant poverty,
inequality, and economic crisis. Now that several decades have passed, it has become
possible to examine the effect that democratization has had on the shape of development
in some of these countries. Is it the type of regime or its political capacity that has a
greater effect on income inequality in underdeveloped countries? To address this
question, this thesis looks at the level of democracy, the political performance, and the
functional income distribution in Argentina and Brazil from the breakdown of their
respective authoritarian regimes to the present.
The effect of democratization on economic growth has been thoroughly covered
in the literature, but its effect on development is generally limited to an examination of
per capita GDP. Thus there is a dearth of literature with a focus on the effect of
democracy on the shape of economic development--the winners and losers. Put another
way, the existing literature tends to focus on the change in average wealth within a
country rather than the effects democratization may have on specific sectors of the
economy. Given that the wave of democratic transition brought with it a hope for the
alleviation of extreme poverty and inequality, it is important to evaluate this relationship.
1

This study will attempt to examine the effect that democratic transition has had on
the shape of development by looking at Argentina and Brazil from their authoritarian
periods up to the present. In addition to the qualitative and contextual evidence available
in the existing literature, it will utilize several indices descriptively to trace changes in
each country over time and to compare the cases to each other. For regime type, this
study will use the Polity IV index. It will use Relative Political Extraction as a proxy
measure for political performance. Additionally, it will use the Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to look at corruption and its relationship
to democracy and political performance. It will also use the Inter-American Development
Bank’s Structural Reform Index (SRI) to look at any effect that development strategy
could have on the shape of economic development. Finally, it will use data derived from
the United Nations National Accounts Statistics and the International Labor
Organization’s Yearbooks of Labor Statistics to chart the functional income distribution
and its change from period to period.
The central argument of this study is that in Argentina and Brazil, the degree of
governance has had a more significant effect on development than has the level of
democracy. A regime comprised of weak, incapable institutions will have trouble
affecting broad, equitable development regardless of how democratic it is. This argument
is confirmed by the findings to be presented in this paper which show that, despite
successful democratization and likely consolidation of democracy, neither Argentina nor
Brazil have alleviated the epidemic of extreme inequality or altered their respective
2

economies toward a more equitable income distribution. Only after political capacity
improved did either country begin a move toward more equitable economic development.
This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter 2 reviews the existing
literature related to democracy, political performance, and development. It covers the
neoliberal economic development model--the dominant model throughout the Third
Wave of democratization--and its relationship to democracy and development. It then
reviews the body of literature pertaining to structural and institutional factors affecting
development with a focus on political performance. Chapter 3 proposes the research
design to be used in this study. Chapter 4 reports the findings of this research. It traces
Argentina and Brazil from their respective authoritarian periods, through their transitions
and to the present with a focus on regime type, political performance, and income
distribution. Chapter 5 discusses the findings, addresses limitations to this research,
discusses policy implications, and offers potential areas of further research.

3

Chapter - 2
Literature Review

The Third Wave of democratization, which began with Portugal’s Carnation
Revolution in 1974, brought transitions toward democracy in many Less Developed
Countries (LDCs), particularly in Latin America and the Asian Pacific in the 1980s.
These emerging democratic regimes were faced with the trilemma of confronting fiscal
crisis and promoting economic growth and equitable development without damaging
their new and fragile democracies. They needed to choose economic policies that would
foster steady, long term, equitable growth without damaging their popular legitimacy and
risking a slide back into authoritarianism. They needed a developmental strategy that
would lift their most vulnerable populations out of poverty and set their countries on a
path to prosperity in an increasingly global economy. They needed to tackle the legacy
of poverty and extreme inequality often inherited from the era of authoritarianism. They
needed to do so through their emerging democratic institutions.
What is the relationship between democratization and the shape of economic
development in LDCs? The Third Wave democracies tended toward developmental
strategies in line with neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. The policies related
to this developmental model promised to curb inflation and stabilize the economy, foster
economic growth, and lift the LDCs out of situations of endemic poverty and inequality.
Countries that followed this path had varying degrees of success. In Latin America the
4

Washington Consensus is seen to have been a failure with regard to reducing poverty and
inequality and performed poorly at staving off fiscal crisis and hyperinflation in the
1980s and 1990s (Arestis 2004; Bresser Pereira 1993; Moreno-Brid et. al. 2004). What
explains this poor performance? There is also significant variance in outcomes between
countries within the region despite similar conditions and external pressures. What
accounts for this variance?
This chapter reviews the existing literature regarding the relationship between
democracy, degree of governance, and economic development. It begins with an
overview of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. It traces competing
arguments regarding the relationship between democracy and neoliberal economic
reforms. From there it reviews developmental strategies from Social-Democratic and
institutional perspectives. It then goes into the institutional and structural factors of
democracy that affect policy choices and shape development. It concludes with a review
of Political Performance and its relationship to the extraction and allocation of resources
that determine a country’s economic trajectory.

Neoliberal Economic Development and the Washington Consensus
Economic neoliberalism, which dominated global economic and developmental
ideology during the Third Wave of democratization, takes as its starting point the
primacy of individual liberty and the belief that economic freedom is a necessary
5

condition for political freedom (Friedman 1962). The neoliberal development model,
which was promoted by Milton Friedman and advocated by Margaret Thatcher and
Ronald Reagan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, “the
Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury, the finance ministries of the G-7 countries, and the
chairmen of the twenty most important commercial banks” (Bresser Pereira et. al. 1993:
19), swept through the Third Wave countries of Asia and Latin America in the 1980s and
1990s. An understanding of this ideology is therefore central to the analysis of economic
development in LDCs through the 1980s.
Neoliberalism’s policy agenda, which was coined by World Bank economist John
Williamson as the “Washington Consensus,” includes ten general policy prescriptions
based on reliance on markets exclusively to bring about efficient reallocation of
resources1. The common theme of the Washington Consensus and neoliberal
development strategy is the reduction of the role of the state through strategies such as
deregulation and privatization. Compared to the import-substitution-industrialization
(ISI) model which was common in Third Wave democracies in Latin America and Asia,
neoliberalism suggests a much smaller role for the state (Griffin 1989). The pertinent
questions regarding the neoliberal development strategy would be how such policy
prescriptions would affect the shape of economic development in poorer countries and

1

These policies include: (1) control of fiscal deficits, (2) reorientation of public expenditure
priorities, (3) tax reform with an emphasis on a broad base and moderate rates, (4) allowing
markets to determine interest rates, (5) allowing markets to determine exchange rates, (6)
outward-oriented trade liberalization, (7) liberalization of finance, especially Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), (8) privatization of state-owned enterprises, (9) economic deregulation, and
(10) security of property rights (Kingstone 2011: 29).
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how such a developmental model would be implemented through new and fragile
democratic institutions.

Neoliberalism and Democracy
The literature contains significant debate as to the relationship between neoliberal
economic reform and the democratic process, particularly regarding new, fragile
democracies of the Third Wave. Arguments for the existence of a positive relationship
point to the reelection of presidents who had implemented neoliberal reforms2 and polling
data showing popular preference for markets over the state in certain realms (Kingstone
2011).
Neoliberalism’s advocates also suggest that the Washington Consensus’ focus on
curbing inflation creates a political and democratic base of support because inflation
disproportionately hurts the more broad, less wealthy segment of the populations in
question (Weyland 2004). The counter argument to this claim is that, while the
Washington Consensus focuses on inflation, it tends to ignore and arguably increase
unemployment. It is argued that when faced with bleak economic prospects, populations
tend to be overwhelmingly more concerned with job security than the price of goods and
services (Bresser Pereira et. al. 1993). Therefore, the common arguments for a positive

2

Menem in Argentina and Cardoso in Brazil are two such examples.
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relationship between neoliberal economic reform and democracy are not entirely
convincing.

Neoliberalism Against Democracy
There are a number of common arguments that neoliberal development is at odds
with democracy. The first is that neoliberalism is too often imposed from abroad, both
directly and indirectly. The direct route of “neoliberalism from abroad” flows through
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF, the World Bank, and other
private international investment groups. Examples of such impositions include Mexico’s
1982 debt default and Bolivia’s bout with hyperinflation in 1985. In both cases, the
executives were compelled to turn toward neoliberal reforms in order to gain new
financing (Bresser Pereira et. al. 1993; Kingstone 2011). Neoliberalism is also imposed
from abroad in an indirect way through globalization and the decentralization of global
finance. The fact that the economic model du jour is neoliberal indirectly pressures poor
governments to follow suit, particularly with the rapid spread of global finance in the
1980s and 1990s. This occurs regardless of the best interests of the country in crisis.
A second, perhaps more persuasive argument pitting neoliberal economic reforms
against democracy is the phenomenon of “neoliberalism by surprise,” in which politicians
seem to conceal their true agenda while running for office, only to switch course once
elected. They do so because of neoliberalism’s significant social cost and associated
political opposition (Pereira et. al. 1993). A few examples of this sort of political bait8

and-switch include Menem in Argentina, Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia, Fujimori in Peru, and
Andres Perez in Venezuela.
These arguments for an incongruence between democracy and neoliberalism are
not uniformly accepted. Leslie Armijo and Philippe Faucher (2002) examine Chile,
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico from 1970 to 1999 and find that external economic
assistance such as IMF and World Bank loan packages have no effect on the economic
reforms in their sample. They also find that political insulation does not affect the
likelihood of pro-market reform. Most importantly, they find that pro-market reforms
must be preceded by shifts in elite preferences, and shifts in popular preferences in the
case of democracies.
It is also argued that neoliberal economic reforms weaken democratic institutions
and processes by exacerbating the tendency toward delegative democracy--a system in
which elected leaders are expected to solve problems without a need for transparency and
accountability (Bresser Pereira et. al. 1993). This is particularly true in time of crisis.
Haggard and Kaufman (2008) demonstrate that economic crisis increases the influence of
technocrats vis-a-vis voters, unions, and other economic stakeholders. Given that the
LDC shift toward neoliberal economics occurred largely in the crisis-rich period of the
1980s and early 1990s as opposed to times of robust and stable economies, Westerninfluenced technocrats likely played an outsized role in the shift.
Perhaps the most damning argument against a positive relationship between
neoliberal development and democracy is the fact that the purest examples of this
9

development model have happened coercively. Griffin (1989) evaluates alternative
development strategies on a number of criteria including level of democracy and finds no
correlation between regime type and development strategy except at the margins, where
he sees Friedman-style monetarism. He cites Pinochet’s Chile as the purest example of a
monetarist strategy, which occurred necessarily under a brutally coercive authoritarian
regime.

Neoliberalism and Equitable Development
How does the neoliberal economic model affect the shape of development in the
forms of equality and human capital? Griffin (1989) examines the relationship between
the neoliberal or “monetarist” development model and human capital formation in the
forms of health, nutrition, job skills, and education, and finds that the neoliberal or
monetarist developmental strategy performs much more poorly than alternative strategies
such as ISI, Communism, or redistributive strategies of development. Others agree
(Bresser Pereira 1993; Stiglitz 2011).
Griffin also argues that monetarism performs poorly at alleviating poverty and
inequality because neoliberal reforms tend to promote capital-intensive growth and tend
to neglect land reform, whereas labor-intensive growth and land reform are viewed as
keys to the reduction of poverty and inequality. In short, the Washington Consensus may
be seen as a failure with regard to equitable development and the alleviation of poverty
and inequality, particularly in Latin America (Moreno-Brid 2004)
10

Structural and Institutional Factors Affecting Development
Much of the literature argues that successful growth and development depend less
on the specific developmental strategy chosen than on the quality and shape of
institutions through which policy choices are made. In this sense, there is “no best path
to development,” (Griffin 1989: 236); weak institutions will hinder any development
strategy. It is thus arguable that the failures of the neoliberal economic strategy in LDCs
are a result of institutional weakness rather than flaws in the strategies themselves. How,
then, do institutional factors affect policy choices, the allocation of resources, poverty,
and inequality?
Modernization Theory as posited by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) and
confirmed by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) tackles the question of how economic
development affects democracy and demonstrates that economic development at least
sustains democracy where it already exists. The theory suggests that as societies become
more urban, wealthy, and educated, a middle class grows, the cost of transmitting
information decreases, and civil society flourishes and demands representation through
democratic institutions. But how does democracy affect development? How do regime
characteristics affect developmental strategies and economic policy choices?
Haggard and Kaufman (2008) examine the effect of democratization on
responsiveness of governments to the interests of low-income groups and find that
11

democracy has had no general impact on social spending, arguing that this is because
new democracies face a number of political and economic constraints. They do find,
however, that new democracies in Latin America tended to opt for more targeted antipoverty reforms than their authoritarian predecessors, which opted for shallow, wide
ranging reforms. They also indicate that targeted anti-poverty programs are preferred by
the World Bank and the Washington Consensus over broad social safety nets, which
seems to confirm the earlier argument for neoliberalism imposed from abroad.
As expected, economic crisis has a profound effect on politics, and specifically
economic policy, leading to radical, disruptive reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). It
also increases the relative influence of technocrats as previously discussed, and
undermines institutional foundations. In the reverse direction of the crisis-politics
relationship, it is found that democracy reduces the incidence of economic crisis because
competition causes moderation of policy through veto points, checks, and balances
(Tseblis 1995; Armijo and Gervasoni 2010).
While external factors indeed play a role in growth and development, their effect
on economic policy choices should not be overstated. Through an examination of
nineteen Latin American countries from 1982 through 1998, Remmer (2002) finds that
internal politics matter significantly more than external factors. In particular, she finds
that unionization and government partisanship have a much greater influence on policy
than does the external economic environment.

12

While some explanations of the structural effects on growth and development
focus on inter-party politics and labor organizations, others focus more directly on
political institutions themselves and how these institutions affect resource allocation and
thus development. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et. al. (2002) use formal theoretical
modeling to argue that a more democratic regime will make the provision of public goods
more favorable relative to private goods. This is because the elected leader owes her
success to a larger group (those that voted for her, the “winning coalition”) than does an
autocrat, making the provision of public goods a more attractive way to produce value for
that group. Bueno de Mesquita et. al. then confirm this theoretical argument through a
wealth of empirical evidence which demonstrates that democracies provide more public
goods than autocracies. They find that income, growth, investment, civil liberties,
property rights, government transparency, and a host of public health, education, and
social security measures all increase as the size of the winning coalition increases. When
an executive requires a larger group in order to gain or retain her position, developmental
policies should be more equitable. Democracy should positively affect equality according
to this argument.

Assessing Political Performance
While the previous section surveyed the literature on democracy and its
relationship to economic reforms and strategies, this section examines political
performance itself, independent of regime type. As much of the literature reviewed
13

above argues, the strength of political and economic institutions is a strong determinant
of the effectiveness of economic development. Put another way, political performance
strongly affects economic performance.
The degree of governance or performance of political institutions are not
intrinsically linked with the type of regime in power. Only recently, however, has
political science undergone an attempt to systematically analyze and compare states
based on political performance across regime types and indifferent to them. Regardless of
the internal process of policy formation, policy choices must be implemented through
political institutions which can vary in effectiveness. The capacity of these institutions in
turn affect to some extent the trajectory of a country’s growth and development. In order
to measure and compare the political performance independent of regime type, Kugler
and Tammen (2012) develop a dynamic index: Relative Political Capacity (RPC). Their
aim is “to provide a workable approximation of the effect of policy choices on economic
growth on a national level” (Kugler and Tammen 2012: 49).
RPC is divided into three component indexes: Relative Political Extraction (RPE),
Relative Political Reach (RPR), and Relative Political Allocation (RPA) (Kugler and
Tammen 2012). This is a novel way to conceptualize the aim of governments. They
extract resources from their populations, usually in the form of taxes. They seek to
“reach” or have access to as much of their population as possible. Finally, they decide
how to allocate the resources that they have extracted from the population that was within
their reach. These three components interact to determine the political capacity of a
14

government. A regime’s political capacity theoretically affects its economic health,
including incidence of poverty and level of inequality.
LDCs, particularly the new democracies of the Third Wave, tend toward newer
and weaker political institutions than the rich, time-tested democracies of Western
Europe and North America. The relative ability of a developing country to extract
resources from its population will affect the government’s ability to resist upheaval-which is crucial in a new democracy--and to perform its other essential functions such as
facilitating growth and development. Extraction is therefore a central issue to newer,
more fragile, and less developed polities. Implementing a growth-facilitating tax system
should thus be the central concern in developing countries. RPE is a method of
measuring and comparing states’ abilities to extract these necessary resources from their
populations.
Political reach is also a principal problem in most LDCs. In order to extract the
necessary revenue, a government must be able to reach a sufficient segment of the
population. Institutions such as independent courts and the rule of law are instrumental in
determining what portion of the population is actually being governed by the political
regime in rule. Weak institutions and low RPR contribute to the manifestation of
expansive informal economic sectors of the LDCs throughout Latin America. Low levels
of RPR as seen in weak rule of law and ill-defined property rights are argued to stunt the
ability of LDCs to develop and prosper, contributing to the plight of the lower strata of
the population (de Soto 2000). In countries in which the underground economy prevails,
15

governments suffer from weak political capacity due to the failure to extract resources
and cannot generate revenue that provides productivity-enhancing public goods. In
circumstances like this, a vicious cycle of underdevelopment repeats itself.” (Kugler and
Tammen 2012: 57-8). Commerce exists in even the most underdeveloped regions of the
world; societies depend upon it. However, if governments lack the capacity to tap into
the local marketplace, they may fail to extract the resources necessary to perform. While
the interactive effects of RPR, RPE, and RPA are still unknown, it is intuitive that
political reach and extraction are related.
After reach and extraction comes the problem of allocation. The determination of
how to allocate resources requires the balancing of current and future benefits, economic
prosperity and political stability, and is always constrained by the desire of political elites
to retain office. The added influence of political alignments, welfare legacies, and the
global and regional economic environment makes certain that allocative decisions are
complex and multifaceted. Of course, once the decision on how to allocate resources is
made, there is the issue of policy implementation, which is reflective of the strength and
effectiveness of the institutions responsible for resource distribution. As RPC is mostly
concerned with economic growth, its allocation component compares how resources are
used relative to how they would theoretically be used to maximize economic growth,
fully aware that growth is not the only goal of government allocation (Tammen 2000).
Government allocation may be weighted either toward the provision of public
goods or private goods. This component of RPC is therefore most closely tied with
16

corruption in the form of the clientelistic distribution of private goods to those that helped
political elite achieve or retain power, also known as patronage. The literature suggests
several factors that affect the incidence of patronage. First, and as previously mentioned,
the more narrow an incumbent base, the greater the incidence of patronage (Bueno de
Mesquita et. al. 2002). This fact is confirmed by Karen Remmer (2007). By examining
Argentina from 1983-2003, and operationalizing patronage as increase in administrative
spending in total, per capita, and as a percentage of GDP, Remmer determines that
poverty and non-tax revenue such as foreign aid or natural resources also increase
patronage. That poverty increases the inefficiency of resource allocation suggests an
important reason to seek to reduce poverty: poverty hurts political performance. That
foreign aid actually affects the efficiency of political allocation negatively suggests that
foreign aid may work at cross purposes with regard to development, an interesting and
counterintuitive finding.
In sum, the extent to which governments are able to reach out to their populations,
the effectiveness with which the extract resources therefrom, and the ways in which they
reallocate those resources have profound implications for how their countries grow and
develop. Policy choices result from a complex web of competing forces, many of which
are independent of regime type, and the success of their implementation depends largely
upon the capacity of political institutions.

17

This chapter has reviewed the literature pertaining to the relationship between
democracy and economic development in Third Wave democracies of the
underdeveloped world. It has examined the basis behind the Washington Consensus and
corresponding neoliberal economic development model. It has reviewed the cases for
and against the relationship between neoliberal economic reforms and democracy and
shown that both sides have merit. That said, the literature does seem to suggest some
glaring weakness with regard to economic neoliberalism. In particular, the monetarist
development strategies tend to increase unemployment and may actually contribute to
economic crisis in LDCs with weak political and economic institutions.
The strength of political institutions seems to be a crucial factor in fostering
economic growth and equitable development. The literature suggests that the
developmental strategies chosen are less important than the institutions through which
they are carried out. Most sides seem to agree that economic reform will be most
effective in providing the most good for the most people if developed through democratic
institutions with ample participation and transparency.
The literature highlights that the allocation of resources is a strong determinant of
the success of economic growth and development. However, allocative choices and their
implementation are affected by a large number of complex, interacting, and competing
forces. Democracy plays some role in these choices, but so do economic constraints,
stakeholder preferences, welfare legacies, the partisanship of those in office, labor
unionization, international financial institutions, globalization, foreign aid, and
18

ideological trends. In short, the effects of democracy on development--and particularly
on poverty and inequality--are unclear. Perhaps it is not the level of democracy that
determines the ability of a country to develop, but rather the capacity of its government-regardless of regime type--to perform the functions necessary for sustained growth and
equitable development.
This thesis focuses on how democratization and political performance have
affected economic development in two LDCs--Argentina and Brazil. Much of the
existing literature focuses on economic growth and tends to ignore the relationship
between politics and development with a focus on inequality. This thesis will use the
cases of Argentina and Brazil beginning with the breakdown of their authoritarian
regimes in the 1980s. In order to examine the relationship, this thesis will use functional
income distribution as its dependent variable, measured as Labor’s share of national
income. It will use the Polity IV index to measure the level of democracy, as is common
in the literature. To approximate political performance it will use RPE. As a component
of institutional performance it will utilize Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index. It will also examine the extent to which each regime adhered to a
neoliberal development strategy. This will be done using the structural reform index
developed by Eduardo Lora (2012) of the Inter-American Development Bank.
Based on this literature review, it can be concluded that there are conflicting
arguments concerning the relationship between political development, economic

19

development, and functional income distribution. The next chapter will provide the
research design that is used in this study to analyze this relationship.

20

Chapter - 3
Research Design

As previously stated, the existing literature lacks a consensus with regard to the
effects of democratization and political performance on the distribution of income in
developing countries. The purpose of this chapter is to propose a research design that
sheds light on this relationship. First, it will introduce and justify the cases to be
examined and analyzed. It will then propose a theory based on the existing literature.
From there, it will explain and operationalize the variables that will be used in the
research and justify a model of analysis that should lead to meaningful conclusions with
regard to the question at hand. Based on the literature previously presented, this research
will examine how democratization and political performance affect economic
development in two Third Wave LDCs, Argentina and Brazil, employing the research
design explained below. In doing so, it will address how an increase in the level of
democracy or degree of governance affects the equitability of economic development.
This research should speak to the quality of democracy as well as to the performance of
regimes regardless of level of democracy.

21

The Cases
This research will take the form of a case study of Argentina and Brazil. There
are a number of reasons for using these cases in an analysis of the relationship between
democracy and income distribution. Brazil and Argentina were each “third wave”
democratizers. Argentina began the process in 1983 with the breakdown of its military
regime following economic crisis and the disastrous war over the Falkland Islands. Brazil
began a more gradual transition from military government toward democracy in 1982
with direct elections of all state governors and eventually a civilian president in 1985.
Argentina and Brazil possess the two largest economies in South America. For these
reasons, they are each referred to as “strategic swing states” in democratization literature
(Diamond 2009). Their size and location also somewhat minimize the influence of the
United States on their economic policy, which is important because this analysis is
examining internal factors and therefore benefits from as little external influence as
possible. This makes Argentina and Brazil better candidates for this study than a country
closer to the United States such as Mexico or a smaller, more economically dependent
country such as the Dominican Republic. Finally, given that poverty and inequality are at
the heart of an examination of functional income distribution, it seems crucial to examine
less developed countries. Latin America is generally underdeveloped and suffers from
relatively immense poverty, inequality, and associated health concerns. Brazil and
Argentina are not exceptions to these regional phenomena. Therefore, Argentina and
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Brazil seem to be reasonable cases for studying the effects of democratization on income
distribution in LDCs and emerging markets.
Given the fact that the level of democracy is of primary concern, this research will
focus on each case beginning with their late authoritarian periods, through
democratization, and leading to the present. Argentina democratized in 1983 and Brazil
began democratization in 1985, so this research will begin its examination in 1980. By
doing so it will capture development in both highly authoritarian and relatively
democratic periods as well as the periods of transition.
This research will therefore begin in the early 1980s. It will engage in a detailed
examination of Argentina and Brazil with a focus on events leading to significant
changes in each case’s level of democracy and the periods that followed such changes. It
will compare income distributions in the authoritarian period to the transition and
consolidation phases in an attempt to gain insight on the relationship between
democratization and inequality. It will also examine dynamic changes to political
performance so as to determine whether political performance is a stronger factor in
determining functional income distribution than is regime type. It will also pay acute
attention to stark changes in development strategy, economic policy, and financial policy
in the various periods of democratization. Ideally, what will emerge from this case study
is a clearer picture of the effects that democratization and political performance have on
functional income inequality in two developing Latin American countries.
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Theoretical Perspective
This study will be based on the structural and institutional theoretical perspectives
outlined in the previous chapter. From this perspective, an increase in the quality of
democratic institutions should cause an increase in the equality of economic development
through an increase in veto points in policy formation (Tsebelis 1995), as well as an
increased incentive for political elites to provide public rather than private goods due to
an increase in the winning coalition relative to that of the selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita
2002). Theoretically, an increase in the level of democracy should therefore increase
popular representation. As larger and therefore poorer segments of the population
increasingly affect policy choices, those policies should lead to more favorable outcomes
for more people. However, a poor, poorly performing, or corrupt democracy may be
simply unable to effectively implement broadly popular and beneficial economic policy
when it so chooses (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Therefore, this research will also be
using the theoretical framework of Kugler and Tammen (2012) to examine the effect of
political performance, independent of the level of democracy, on equitable development.
Regarding economic development, this research will follow the conceptual framework of
Guerrero (2012), who developed measures of functional income distribution based on
labor’s share of national income.
Based on identified key concepts in the literature, the key question to be tested is:
How is labor’s share of national income affected the level of democracy, political
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performance, corruption, and the type of development strategy chosen by the elites? The
following hypotheses are considered to examine this question:

H1: An increase in the level of democracy positively affects labor’s share
of national income
H0a: The level of democracy is unrelated to labor’s share of national
income
H2: An increase in political performance positively affects labor’s share
of national income
H0b: Political performance is unrelated to labor’s share of national
income

In order to test these hypotheses, key concepts such as the level of democracy, political
performance, and functional income distribution need to be operationalized through key
variables.

Key Variables

Economic Development
This thesis is concerned with the ways in which democratization and degree of
governance affect the shape of economic development. Rather than using a simple
measure such as GDP per capita which merely captures the increasing income of the
25

“average” member of a population, this thesis will concern itself with equality of
economic development. It will do so because inequality is a significant and common
feature of many of the less developed Third Wave democracies. Moreover, income
inequality is a feature that is argued to stifle human development, public health,
economic growth, and the consolidation of democracy itself (Wilkinson and Pickett
2010). Therefore, the dependent variable of this research will be the functional
distribution of income.
This thesis will focus specifically on labor’s factor share of national income.
There are several reasons for the use of labor’s factor share of national income as the
dependent variable in this research. Guerriero (2012) suggests at least three such reasons.
First, an examination of the functional distribution of income can help connect
macroeconomic measures with incomes at the household level. Second, such a study can
aid in the understanding of income inequality. This relationship between factor shares
and income inequality is complex, but factor income distribution may be an important
determinant of personal income distribution given that wealth and capital tend to be more
unequally distributed than income (Piketty 2013). Third, factor shares are relevant to the
addressing of certain social justice concerns. For instance, there is an arguable link
between employer profits and employee perception of “fair” wages (Guerriero 2012: 34). Of particular interest to this research, it is found that there has been a general, global
decline in labor’s factor share of income since the mid-1980s, corresponding with the
third wave of democratization as well as the rise of the neoliberal economic model. It is
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also crucial to this research to note that despite the common assumption of classical
economic theorists, factor income shares are not directly related to stages of economic
development once self-employment is properly accounted for (Guerriero 2012: 13).
Therefore, changes in factor income shares are more likely to be an effect of policy
choices and implementation than of national wealth.
Labor share (LS) is broadly defined as the percent of national income which
accrues to labor or, in other words, total compensation of employees divided by national
income. The use of total employee compensation rather than merely wages and salaries is
preferred because it includes the non-wage forms of payment like tips, bonuses, and
employer contributions to pensions and social security.
There are two main interrelated conceptual issues with regard to capturing LS.
The first is that labor and capital are not so neatly divided in practice as they are in
theory. In fact many if not most individuals and households tend to derive their income
from a number of different sources. The totality of one household’s earnings cannot be
neatly categorized as either labor or capital. The second issue in conceptualizing LS is
how determine the share of self-employment income that constitutes labor income. Selfemployment is especially concerning in the assessment of developing countries, where
the informal economy and self-employment tend to be relatively prevalent. “In
developing countries labor income is badly understated by the employees’ compensation
measure, which also risks changing significantly only as a consequence of a possible
trend away from informal employment” (Guerriero 2012: 5).
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Capturing self-employment within LS is therefore crucial. However, there is no
consensus as to how much of self-employment income should count toward labor
income. For instance, while Johnson (1954) attributes roughly two thirds of selfemployment income to labor, Kravis (1959) suggests that virtually all self-employment
income in developing countries comes from labor services. Perhaps more reasonably,
self-employment income can be assumed to take on the same labor/capital ratio as the
rest of the economy (Harrison 2002). Following the work of Guerriero (2012) this
research uses three measures of LS3:

3

Guerrero (2012) developed six different measures of LS, labeled LS through LS6. This
research utilizes the three measures (LS1, LS4, and LS6) for which the most data are available
pertaining to Argentina and Brazil. It retains the original labels for each measure to remain
consistent with Guerrero’s original work.
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LS1 is the unadjusted measure of labor’s factor share. It entirely ignores selfemployment. LS4 treats self-employment income as if it follows the same labor-to-capital
income ratio as the rest of the economy. While oversimplified, it improves on the
unadjusted LS by conceding that self-employment income includes at least some amount
of capital income. Guerriero argues that LS6 is the most accurate measure of labor’s
factor share. It incorporates self-employment income by attributing the average
employee’s earnings to the entire workforce less the employers. It assumes that those
members of the labor force who are not employers tend to earn similarly whether they are
employees, self-employed, or family workers. The denominator of each measure
subtracts indirect taxes and fixed capital from total value added because they go neither
toward labor compensation nor capital gains. This adjustment to value added will only
take place for years where data on indirect taxes and fixed capital are available.
The data used to compute the three LS measures in this research are retrieved
from the United Nations National Accounts Statistics (UNNAS) database and the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Yearbooks of Labor Statistics. The UNNAS
database provides yearly data collected for 178 countries since 1946. The ILO Yearbooks
of Labor Statistics include country profiles and statistics on almost 200 countries from
1969 onward. They provide data on the workforce based on many factors including the
International Classification of Status in Employment (ICSE-1993)--from which the
numerators of the LS equations shall be derived. It must be noted that while the three
measures of LS will differ, we are less concerned with the absolute value of LS than its
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change over time. Given the fact that the three LS measures follow the same dynamic
trend it is less crucial which specific LS measure are employed.

Level of Democracy: Polity IV
The primary independent variable for this thesis is the level of democracy. It will
be quantified through the use of the Polity IV index. The index is part of the Polity
Project started by the Center for Systemic Peace. It covers 167 countries from 1800
through 2013. It provides a “polity score” for each country for each year ranging from 10 to +10 with -10 representing hereditary monarchy and +10 representing consolidated
democracy. Polity scores are also divided into three main regime categories. Scores
between -10 and -6 are categorized as “autocracies,” scores between -5 and +5 are
categorized as “anocracies,” and scores from +6 through +10 are categorized as
“democracies.” Polity IV uses six component measures to capture information on three
features of government: executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and
political competition. Its focus is on central governments (The Polity Project).
Polity IV also suffers from some criticism. Components such as “constraints on
the chief executive,” while crucial to the measurement of the level of democracy, are
difficult to measure. Beyond measurement issues, Polity IV also arguably suffers from
the problems of redundancy and convoluted aggregation rules (Munck and Verkuilen
2002). Also, compared to other indices such as the Freedom House Index, which
incorporates civil liberties and political participation, Polity IV offers a rather minimalist
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definition of democracy. Perhaps the most robust criticism of Polity IV as well as
measures such as the Freedom House Index suggests that these indexes fail to capture the
difference between genuine and defective democracies and argues that many of the Third
Wave democracies are stable, yet defective (Merkel 2004). The basis of this argument is
that elections and democratic procedures are not sufficient conditions for embedded,
liberal democracy. According to this argument, a genuine, embedded democracy also
requires strong political and civil rights and horizontal accountability. Polity IV is argued
to neglect these features.
Despite these drawbacks, Polity IV is a relatively high quality measure of the
level of democracy. It offers clear and detailed coding rules, tests of intercoder reliability,
and its disaggregated data are publicly available (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). It is
widely used throughout democratization literature. For example,

Acre and Bellinger

(2011) use the Polity IV index to show that protests in Latin America increase with
economic liberalization in democratic settings, and Jong-A-Ping and Haan (2011) use the
index to examine how regime type and duration affect the acceleration of economic
growth. It is favorable to the Freedom House Index because Polity IV offers a single
score rather than two scores. It has a narrower and more minimalist definition of
democracy which emphasizes reliability and consistency compared to the more
maximalist approach of Freedom House (McMahon and Kornheiser 2010). Therefore, the
Polity IV index should be an effective variable in this research.
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Political Performance: RPE
This research will use political performance as a second independent variable
with the potential to affect the distribution of income. As previously stated, some argue
that political performance is a stronger economic determinant than is regime type.
Following the work of Kugler and Tammen (2012) this thesis will use RPE as a proxy for
political performance. The aim of RPE is “to measure the marginal ability of
governments to implement new options--controlling for commitments they previously
made” (Kugler and Tammen 2012: 17). It captures the innate capacity of governments to
implement the policies they choose--regardless of what those policies happen to be.
Because it is concerned with the realm of politics, the focus of RPE is on the extraction of
resources from its population rather than natural resources or foreign aid. It is therefore
measured through an analysis of tax revenue:

A country’s predicted tax takes into account the specific economic profile and tax
structure of that country’s economy. Because developed and developing countries differ
greatly in how their economies are structured, there are two distinct models used to
estimate RPE (Kugler and Tammen 2012):
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For developing countries, agricultural production is used as a control variable
because it captures the effects of a subsistence economy. In developed countries GDP
more accurately reflects the tax base and therefore serves as an effective control variable
in Model 2 (Kugler and Tammen 2012: 18). The allure of RPE is that it is a dynamic
measure and independent of regime type. It allows for comparisons within a country over
time as well as comparisons between different countries. Given that this study compares
developing countries, data will be derived using Model 1.

Corruption
Corruption is another variable that will be examined in this research. A corrupt
government should theoretically be less likely to enact policies that lead to broad
development and more equal income distribution because it tends to squander resources
or funnel them to small segments of the population. This thesis will utilize the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International, which is the
most widely used indicator of corruption worldwide (Transparency International).
The CPI relies on a number of “data sources from independent institutions
specializing in governance and business climate analysis” that “measure perceptions of
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corruption in the public sector” (transparency.org). Prior to 2012 it used that data to
generate an annual score for each country ranging from zero to ten with zero being most
corrupt and ten being least corrupt. However, in 2012 Transparency International altered
its methodology, opting to score from 0 to 100, and making scores prior to 2012
incomparable to those after.
While the CPI may not be ideal for capturing the actual corruption apparent in a
society, it has been validated as among the most effective measures of corruption
available (Wilhelm 2002). However, one concern regarding the use of CPI in this
research is that data only goes back to 1995 whereas this research is interested with the
period from 1980 to the present. Nevertheless, a look at corruption and its relationship to
functional distribution of income from 1995 to the present may provide valuable insight
given the fact that corruption is theorized to negatively impact popular economic sectors
(Wilhelm 2002).

Development Strategy
This research will also look at the specific development strategies that were
pursued by the cases in question. Given the fact that the Third Wave of democratization
corresponded temporally with the rise in popularity of the neoliberal development model-particularly in Latin America--it seems important to examine how the extent to which
developing countries with new democracies pursued neoliberal reforms affected their
functional income distributions and thus the shape of their development.
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In order to operationalize the development strategy pursued by the regimes being
examined, this thesis will utilize the Structural Reform Index created by Eduardo Lora for
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). “The structural reform index measures
how favorable policies in the trade, financial, tax, privatization, and labor areas are for
the proper working of markets” (Lora 2012: 3). The report in which this index was
developed examines all Latin American countries annually from 1985 through 2012. It is
scaled from zero to 1 with the highest scores corresponding with the most pro-market set
of policies. Its only intent is “to measure the neutrality of the policies” (Lora 2012: 26).
In other words, it does not measure the quality of economic policies, but rather, the extent
to which they free markets.
The advantage of the IADB structural reform index is that it examines policy
variables rather than outcome variables (Lora 2012). Unlike indices such as the Heritage
Foundation Economic Freedom Index, which measure structural reforms and their effects
on growth by examining variables such as inflation, foreign trade, or fiscal deficits, the
IADB looks at the policies that affect these outcomes. In doing so, it better captures the
magnitude of economic reforms (Kingstone 2011). Given the debate over the neoliberal
economic strategy and the Washington Consensus it seems imperative to examine not
only political capacity but the nature of the reforms implemented. As previously
discussed, the Washington Consensus prioritizes inflation control and stability over
unemployment, poverty, and economic equality. Radical analysis suggests that the
neoliberal economic model benefits capital to the detriment of labor. As such, an inverse
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relationship between economic openness and labor’s share of national income is
expected.

This chapter has proposed a research design based on theory derived
from the existing literature with the intent of examining how democracy and
political performance affect economic development in two neighboring Latin
American countries. The following chapter will look in depth into the political
transitions of Argentina and Brazil through democratization in an attempt to
ascertain how the quality of democracy affected functional income inequality in
these two countries. Its goal is to tell a causal story regarding democratization
and its effect on income inequality.
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Chapter 4
Findings and Analysis

The following chapter will examine the effects of democratization and political
performance on functional income inequality in Argentina and Brazil. The goal of this
chapter is to shed light on the interaction between the democratic process, political
performance, corruption, and development strategies and policies. In doing so, it will
attempt to answer whether an increase in the level of democracy or political performance
contributes causally to an increase in labor’s share of income in two underdeveloped
countries that have historically suffered from relatively extreme poverty and inequality.

The Authoritarian Periods

Prior to 1984, both Argentina and Brazil were under authoritarian rule in the form
of military dictatorships. Argentina was under military rule from 1966 to 1973 and again
from 1976 through 1983. The second period was known as the “Proceso de
Reorganizacion Nacional,” and was welcomed by the people of Argentina and granted
legitimacy in response to economic crisis and political violence that plagued the
preceding civilian government. Eventually, it emerged as a brutal and violent regime that
would ultimately crumble under the weight of its incoherence and an ill-advised military
failure in the Falkland Islands in 1983. Across the border, Brazil’s armed forces enacted a
coup d’etat against the democratically elected government of Joao Goulart on March 31,
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1964, leading to twenty-one years of authoritarian dictatorship which ended with the
democratic election of Jose Sarney on March 15, 1985.

Level of Democracy
During their respective periods of military rule, Polity IV scored Argentina a -9
on its scale from -10 to 10 placing it among the world’s most complete autocracies.
Argentina’s Military Junta (JM) exercised complete authoritarian control of the political
system and engaged in severe repression of civil society through an anti-subversion
campaign known as the Dirty War, in which between 9,000 and 20,000 civilians were
deemed “subversives” and were kidnapped, tortured, and often murdered. Repressive
laws, justified by discretionary powers granted to the president in a state of siege,
criminalized opinions, beliefs, and affinities. This gave the military commanders broad
opportunity to use their authority in the context of anti-subversion (Arceneaux, 2001).
The legacy of egregious human rights violations throughout the period would haunt the
JM and play a major role in the eventual collapse, transition, and democratic
consolidation.
In slight contrast to Argentina’s JM, Brazil’s authoritarian period began with a
Polity IV score of -9, but by 1975 it had improved to -4 and in 1982 its score increased to
-3 (Figure 4.1). Brazil thus moved from “autocracy” to “anocracy” according to the
Polity Project’s coding. Thus, while Brazil and Argentina were both governed by an
autocratic regime, Brazil’s dictatorship was comparatively less repressive. This signifies
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two differences between Argentina and Brazil: Brazil’s transition to democracy occurred
two years later than Argentina’s and it transitioned from a less authoritarian regime than
that of Argentina.

Political Performance
For reasons previously stated, Relative Political Extraction (RPE) will serve as the
proxy for political performance in this analysis. From the time that the JM took power of
Argentina in 1976 to the time of regime collapse in 1983, Argentina’s RPE dipped from
1.073 to 0.626, a decline of roughly 42 percent (Figure 4.2). This is indicative of the stark
deterioration of the JMs ability to govern effectively. Similarly, Brazil’s military
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government appeared to be losing political capacity at a rapid rate through its last decade
of rule. From 1977 to 1985, Brazil’s RPE score dropped from 1.36 to 0.89 (Figure 4.3).
It is clear from this data that the political capacity of both dictatorships rapidly
deteriorated in the years leading up to their collapse. A regime that fails to perform is
likely to lose power whether in the context of democracy or autocracy.
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Corruption
Unfortunately, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) does not extend back to the
time of these two military dictatorships. However, there is evidence to suggest ample
corruption. For example, members of the Argentine military benefitted economically
from their position in the regime. During this period salaries for government positions
were doubled through budget increases and outright corruption. These increases in
administrative spending can be seen as patronage, a form of clientelism (Remmer 2007).
Additionally, there was substantial “war booty” involved with the dirty war against
subversion. These phenomena coupled with the sharp decrease in political capacity in
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each regime suggest weak and corrupt states and therefore predicts a dearth of broad and
equitable economic development.

Development Strategy
The development strategies implemented by the authoritarian regimes of
Argentina and Brazil differed significantly from one another. The JM in Argentina took
power following the death of Juan Peron, who oversaw a period which can be seen as an
extreme example of corporatism and populism following the model of ImportSubstitution Industrialization (ISI). When the JM took power, Argentina was facing
economic crisis and extreme inflation as well as violent political reprisal. The JM, like
much of the region at the time, saw neoliberalism as the remedy to the failures of ISI.
They turned to conservative Minister of the Economy Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, who
prescribed “a hefty dose of the free market” (Arceneaux, 2001: 130). However, the JM
was unable to implement a cohesive set of reforms due to its institutional makeup. As a
result, the reforms that were enacted were done so piecemeal, in a disjointed fashion, and
hurt nearly every sector of the economy. The neoliberal overhaul would end up failing
miserably.
Compared to the JM, the authoritarian period in Brazil corresponded with a closed
economy guided by “a dictatorship of ultra-nationalistic businessmen” (Pang 2002: 132).
Brazil’s authoritarian regime continued with the ISI strategy throughout their reign,
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which involved privileging the durable goods sector and included export subsidies,
import restrictions, and currency devaluations (Feijo and Nassif, 2013). This was in
contrast with the Asian Tiger countries, which pursued an export-oriented development
strategy with significantly more success than Brazil. By 1985, Brazil’s IADB structural
reform index score was 0.3. At the time of Brazil’s transition to democracy, its economy
was significantly more closed and state-guided than that of Argentina, as shown by the
fact that the IADB structural reform index scores for Argentina and Brazil were more
distant from each other than at any point in time since (Figure 4.4).
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Income Distribution
How did these factors affect income distribution? While the data regarding
employment and wages for this era is largely incomplete and inaccurate, the literature
suggests differing income distributions for Argentina and Brazil. Argentina had a
distorted, inept tax system that penalized the agriculture industry and therefore is likely to
have contributed to economic inequality during the JM’s reign given that agriculture
employed a relatively large segment of the workforce (Corrales 2002: 63). On the other
hand, the literature on Brazil suggests a relatively equitable income distribution. The
authoritarian period was one in which Brazil “witnessed an extended period of social
mobility, with most individuals moving upwards in relation to their fathers during the
1950-1980 era” (Wogart 2010: 386). However, any upward mobility witnessed during
this era came in the context of unsustainable economic growth resulting from the ISI
development strategy it pursued. That said, if the literature is to be taken as accurate, the
JM oversaw a relatively more unequal functional income distribution than Brazil’s
authoritarian regime.

The Transition to Democracy

By 1983 the military dictatorship of Argentina crumbled under the weight of its
own disjointedness and incompetence in the face of economic crisis and agreed to give
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way to democratically elected leadership. Raul Alfonsin, a non-Peronist from the Radical
Civic Union (UCR) party, won Argentina’s presidential election. Two years later in
Brazil, under a great deal of public pressure and popular protest, the military government
decided to reinstall direct presidential elections. Tancredo Neves of the Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) won the election, but became severely ill before
assuming office, eventually passing away on April 21, 1985. His ticket-mate, Jose
Sarney, assumed office as Brazil’s first civilian president since 1964. Thus began the
transition to democracy in the two largest economies of South America.

Level of Democracy
The transition to democracy from 1983 to 1984 earned Argentina a shift on the
Polity IV index from -8 to +8, placing it in the range of “democracy.” The transition went
relatively cleanly and Alfonsin, who ran on a platform of human rights in the wake of the
Dirty War, faced virtually no threat from the military and successfully purged the new
government of members of the JM. Alfonsin’s tenure as president of the renewed
democracy did not continue smoothly, however. From 1988 to 1989, Argentina’s Polity
IV score slid one unit to +7. This would be the lowest that Argentina would ever dip
again. Perhaps due to the new and fragile democracy, or perhaps for his inability to work
effectively with policymakers, Alfonsin was unable to curtail the economic crisis
inherited from the JM regime. In mid-1989, amid the most severe hyperinflation the
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country had ever seen, and in the face of looting and violence leading to 3201 arrests and
16 killed, Alfonsin resigned early in what has been called a “market coup” (Corrales
2002: 86). Early resignation of an executive does not bode well for a newly formed
democracy, but the revolving door of the executive office would remain a theme in
Argentine politics for decades.
Brazil’s transition also earned it an immediate increase in its Polity IV index score
from -3 to +7. This placed Brazil in the category of “democracy” for the first time since it
briefly passed the threshold in 1947. By the end of Sarney’s term in office, Brazil’s Polity
IV score reached +8, where it has remained since (Figure 4.1). The greatest contribution
made to democracy during Sarney’s term was the 1988 Constitution. “Under pressure
from social movements, delegates to the constitutional assembly of 1987-88 enshrined in
the new charter a wide array of social rights that reflected a broad understanding of
citizenship. These included rights to housing, healthcare, employment, and education”
(Hunter and Sugiyama, 2009: 33). However, the infrastructure that would be needed to
implement these broad guarantees had not yet been put in place. How to administer these
rights to housing, healthcare, employment, and education was to be decided by the
constitutional assembly. “In this forum, democratic dynamics thus had a double-edged
effect: to extend coverage to the extremely poor while enhancing the benefits of the
better-off, who lobbied to keep their privileges” (Hunter and Sugiyama, 2009: 35). With
regard to the distribution of resources, it appears that democratization would not
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automatically lead to the anticipated impact. The privileged groups would retain their
relative privilege.

Political Performance
Both Argentina and Brazil enjoyed an increase in political performance
accompanying their transitions away from authoritarianism. By 1989 Argentina’s RPE
rose to 0.840 (Figure 4.5). This is a 34 percent increase from 1983, the last year of
military rule. In Brazil, Sarney’s regime saw an increase in RPE from 0.90 to 1.09 in just
one term, though its trajectory fluctuated sharply (Figure 4.6). This is perhaps due to the
growing pains of the new republic. Nevertheless, both countries’ transitional regimes
oversaw an increase in political capacity, making it clear that they governed more
effectively than their authoritarian predecessors.
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Development Strategy
As previously stated, the authoritarian regime of Argentina oversaw a far more
open economy than that of Brazil. Argentina’s transitional period saw no discernable
trend regarding its Inter-American Development Bank Structural Reform Index (SRI)
score, whereas Brazil’s transitional government, led by Jose Sarney, took the country
from one of the most closed economies in the region (Pang 2002) toward a more open
economic development strategy. By the end of their first democratic regimes, Argentina
and Brazil converged around the same level of economic openness (Figure 4.7).
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It is important to note that both Argentina and Brazil faced economic crises
during their transition periods. While Argentina did not move to open its economy in this
period, Alfonsin did attempt some major reforms, as did Sarney in Brazil. In order to
attack the economic crisis, Alfonsin unveiled the 1986 Austral plan, which involved
freezing prices and replacing the Argentine peso with the Argentine Austral at 1,000 to 1.
It was initially successful at curtailing inflation but by 1988 the economy fell back into
recession. That spring, the regime unveiled the Primavera Plan, a stabilization plan based
on dual exchange rates and an implicit tax on exports Conde 2009: 86). It again had
initial success at curbing inflation, but Alfonsin failed to consolidate the reforms and the
economy again spiraled out of control, leading to a landslide victory for the PJ’s Carlos
Menem in the 1989 elections, to whom Alfonsin would secede the office of President
several months before the end of his term. In Brazil, Sarney’s most significant policy
package was an attempt to curb the dramatic inflation his country endured: The Cruzado
Plan. The Plan was based largely on freezing prices, wages, and exchange rates. It failed.
Sarney left office in 1990 with inflation at 80 percent per month, a deficit of 5-7 percent
of GDP, and external and internal debt totaling greater than $200 billion USD (Pang

50

2002). In both Argentina and Brazil, the transitional regimes failed in their attempts to
curtail hyperinflation and economic crisis.

Income Distribution
While there is not sufficient data to examine a change in labor’s share of national
income for Argentina and Brazil during the first democratic regimes, there is evidence to
suggest that the lower economic sectors were hit particularly hard by the economic
turbulence of this period. The literature suggests a major shift in labor’s share of income
throughout the 1980s as well as a significant increase in poverty (Hunter and Sugiyama
2009). Between 1980 and 1989, poverty tripled in Argentina (Corrales 2002: 89). “The
transfer of national income to the workers [in Argentina] shrank from 50 percent in the
early 80s to 28 percent of the GDP by 1989” (Pang 2001: 97). When coupled with the
fact that hyperinflation disproportionately hurts those worse off economically, it becomes
apparent that both Sarney’s and Alfonsin’s terms involved increased economic
inequality.
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The Consolidation Period
In 1989 and 1990 Argentina and Brazil saw an end to the reign of their respective
transitional presidents. In Argentina, Alfonsin’s failed attempts at economic stabilization
in the face of hyperinflation and political backlash harmed him greatly in his bid for a
second term. What resulted was a landslide victory in the 1989 election for Carlos
Menem and the Judicialist Party (PJ). The crisis got so bad that Alfonsin was compelled
to leave office several months early. It is in this context that Menem and Peronist PJ
regime took power. In Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello of the conservative National
Reconstruction Party (PRN), defeated Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party
(PT) to become the first president elected directly by the people in 29 years, but failed to
complete his term in the face of corruption and impeachment hearings. After his vice
president, Itamar Franco, completed the final two years of Collor’s term, he handed the
baton to Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who would control the executive office for two
terms, paralleling the two-term presidency of Menem in Argentina.

Level of Democracy
By 1989, Brazil’s Polity IV index score was already at +8 whereas Argentina
would reach +8 during the second half of Carlos Menem’s second term (Figure 4.1).
Nevertheless, both Argentina and Brazil were classified as democracies by the start of
this period, and by the end of this period both had identical Polity IV index scores.
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Democracy did not backslide significantly during this period, but it also failed to
make significant gains. The Latin American trend of hyperpresidentialism remained an
issue. In Brazil, Collor frequently used “temporary measures” to circumvent Congress
(Polity Project). The hyperpresidentialism of Menem, however, is more contested. One of
the main points of contestation with regard to Menem’s regime involves the democratic
nature of his economic policy reforms. As will be shown shortly, Menem oversaw an
extreme opening of the Argentine economy and strong adherence to the neoliberal
development model. Some argue that such reforms, which are usually unpopular because
they tend to involve cuts to social spending and increases in short and midterm
unemployment, are difficult to pass through democratic channels due to the ability of
constituencies to sanction politicians through the vote. In democracies such as the one
Menem inherited, they argue, neoliberal reforms must occur “by surprise” (Pereira,
Maravall, and Przeworski 1993: 9). Indeed Menem ran on quite a different platform from
that on which he governed. However, it is argued that because of democratic pressures,
Menem’s reform packages necessarily required a shift in popular preferences (Armijo
and Faucher 2002). Eul-Soo Pang (2001) argues that, relative to other economic reforms
in the region, Menem’s reforms went through democratic channels. “Unlike Mexico, all
of these changes in Argentina were effected through legislative processes, not by
executive fiat” (Pang 2001: 111). It is unclear, however, how accurate this viewpoint is.
The shift in public opinion to which Armijo and Foucher (2002) refer was fleeting at best.
“Public opinion polls showed that support for 'the government's economic policies'
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among those who voted for the PJ in 1989 declined sharply, from 70 percent in
September 1989 (shortly after announcing the reforms) to 27.9 percent in June 1991”
(Corrales 2002: 131). Also, the characterization of Menem using democratic channels
may be misleading. By the end of his reign, Menem had issued 178 Decrees by Necessity
and Urgency (DNU), mostly in economics. This is in contrast to twenty such decrees
issued between 1853 and 1989 (Corrales 2002: 134).
There were other hindrances to Argentine democracy during the Menem era.
Internal political disputes led to general policy incoherence, particularly in his first term.
Throughout the 1990s Argentina was plagued by partisan politics and internal fiscal
fighting that seemed to bankrupt government (Corrales 2002). Menem’s dominance of
Argentine politics, which included not only the aforementioned decrees but the packing
of the Supreme Court with political supporters and changing the constitution to allow for
a second term is seen as a strike against executive constraints (The Polity Project).
On the other hand, parts of Menem’s regime shine a positive light on the quality
of its democracy. Argentina was the only country in Latin America that participated in
the first Gulf War, linking it to global democracy. Unlike Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
which border Iraq and therefore had imminent security interest in the conflict, Saddam’s
Iraq posed no threat to Argentina. Its participation can therefore be explained at least in
part by a desire to align with western, democratic powers. There are also signs that the
regime was responsive to public pressure, which is to be expected from a functioning
democracy. For example, in the fall of 1995, with unemployment reaching 17 percent,
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Menem responded to public pressure to ease the tight money supply and curb
unemployment by removing his finance minister Domingo Cavallo, the architect of
Menem’s economic strategy. Also, the Convertibility Law of 1991, which pegged the
Austral to the USD, is an example of economic legislation which passed through
democratic channels and led to sustainable reform (Corrales 2002).
While Brazil did not backslide to authoritarianism, there are indeed concerns over
the quality of Brazilian democracy during this period. In 1992, Congress removed Collor
from power in the face of rampant corruption. Collor resigned in the final months of 1992
in an attempt to thwart impeachment hearings. In accordance with constitutional
procedures regarding impeachment hearings, his vice president, Itamar Franco, became
acting president. Collor officially resigned on December 29, formally leaving Franco to
serve the remaining two years of Collor’s term. The ability of Congress to check the
power of the executive branch can perhaps be seen as a positive indicator of democratic
consolidation, but the inability of Brazil’s first directly elected president to serve a
complete term indicates democratic weakness.
After the two year Franco presidency, which involved relative success at curbing
hyperinflation, his Finance Minister--Cardoso--won a landslide victory and served as
president for two terms until 2002. While Brazil’s Polity IV score remained at +8
throughout Cardoso’s two terms, the literature suggests Brazil’s democracy was not
initially functioning well for him. “Months into office, Cardoso was unable to push his
reforms through congress. Politics since Sarney had degenerated into ‘what’s in it for
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me,’ and unless the president reciprocated pork for vote it became impossible to get a bill
approved in congress” (Pang 2002: 143). Corruption in the form of clientelism had
tainted the lawmaking process.
Cardoso would prove unable to eradicate the legacy of bartering favors between
the executive and legislative branch, but he was successful in forging popular support and
a broad consensus to accept the generally unpopular necessities of “paying taxes,
trimming fiscal fat, restraining excessive wage demands by powerful unions, and
convincing congress to think boldly” (Pang 2002: 143). His ability to forge such support
earned him a second term, which could be argued as popular support for a significant
liberalization of Brazil’s economy. Some argue that this political maneuvering allowed
Brazil to reap the benefits of the neoliberal development model despite their lack of
popularity and at the same time strengthen democracy. “The limited engagement in
neoliberalism allowed the positive impact of globalization to seep into the country, while
Cardoso consolidated political democracy, endorsed press freedom, and improved on
human rights” (Pang 2002: 144). From this perspective, Cardoso used neoliberalism and
political savvy to benefit both democracy and development. However, a public opinion
poll showed a decrease in respondents who said that “democracy was preferable,” from
50 percent in 1996 to 43 percent in 2007 (Hunter and Sugiyama, 2009: 31). One
explanation is that neoliberal economic reforms increase economic inequalities, which
heighten feelings of unfairness and inefficacy and diminish the perceived legitimacy of a
country’s political institutions. Another explanation is that public ignorance weakened
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democracy and made reform difficult. For example, a 1995 survey showed that a majority
Brazilians thought they would be harmed by Cardoso’s antipoverty entitlement reform
proposals (Hunter and Sugiyama 2009). A lack of public understanding may have led to
resistance that slowed reform and had democracy working against the public interest.

Political Performance
The 1990s were a period in which Argentina and Brazil diverged regarding the
trajectory of their political capacity. Argentina’s RPE was 0.840 when Menem took
office in mid-1989. It peaked at 1.201 in 1992 before taking a massive dive and
bottoming out at 0.644 in 1995. Menem finished his second term with an RPE of 0.729, a
13 percent decrease from the beginning of his reign and 29 percent lower than his peak in
1992 (Figure 4.8). What was responsible for the collapse of Menem’s political capacity in
1992? It appears that corruption played a significant role.
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Unlike Argentina, Brazil’s political capacity showed a net improvement during
this period. However, this improvement was inconsistent and varied with each of the
three executives in office. Collor’s abbreviated term corresponds with a decrease in
political performance. From 1990 to 1993, Brazil’s RPE score decreased from 1.09 to
0.84. However, the shortness of Collor’s term in office renders it difficult to determine
the extent to which Collor’s governance is responsible for the loss of political capacity.
Nevertheless, a pattern has emerged in which a plummet in RPE score tends to precede
an abrupt regime change.4 Given that Franco merely served the remaining term of his
impeached president, it tempting to treat 1993-1995 as a continuation of the Collor

From 1980 to 2011, Brazil’s RPE had a mean of 1.12 and a standard deviation of 0.20. The
decrease in RPE from 1990 to 1993 is therefore greater than one standard deviation.
4
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regime. Nevertheless, Brazil experienced a rebound in political performance after
Collor’s resignation. From 1993 to 1995, Brazil’s RPE increased from 0.84 in 1992 to
1.06 by 1994, before dipping slightly (Figure 4.9).
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It was Cardoso’s two terms in office which would eventually yield the net
increase in Brazil’s political performance during this period. Brazil’s RPE score dropped
from 1.062 to 0.894 from 1994 to 1997, before rising sharply through the end of his term.
Cardoso left office with a RPE score of 1.370 in 2002, bringing Brazil above the global
average (Figure 4.10). This significant improvement in political capacity of the two-term
Brazilian president is in stark contrast with the drop in political performance during the
two-term reign of Menem in Argentina. It appears that corruption is at least a partial
explanation for this difference in the quality of governance between the two regimes
during this consolidation period.
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Corruption
Corruption is a political legacy throughout Latin America, and Argentina and
Brazil are no exception to this phenomenon. This consolidation period, however, is one in
which the perception of corruption and change therein differed between the two
countries. Argentine politics had the reputation of corrupt officials, both military and
civilian prior to Menem’s reign, but his regime perhaps suffered more from corruption
than any other in the post-JM republic. Argentina’s CPI score went from 5.2 in 1995 to
3.5 in 2000 (Figure 4.11). While there is no CPI data corresponding with Menem’s first
term, this still suggests a drastic rise in corruption in the Menem era.

There is also qualitative evidence within the literature to suggest that corruption
was endemic to Menem’s first term. In 1990 “corruption in the highest places threatened
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to unravel the reforms” that Menem had begun in the previous year. “Menem’s men and
women simply took advantage of the situation and indulged overtly in excessive personal
enrichment” (Pang 2001: 101). In order to retain the support of the Peronist party
members and followers, Menem doled out subsidies--patronage in the purest sense. There
was also a 1990 event in which President Bush visited Buenos Aires in order to address
complaints of elite US firms that “corruption, bureaucratic inertia, and outright demands
for bribes” had rendered them unable for them to do business in Argentina (Pang 2001:
104). The companies that filed such complaints were Enron, Firestone, Goodyear, Bell
Atlantic, and AIG.
There is a possible connection between corruption and the economic liberalization
to be discussed next. “The Argentine corruption was the appropriation of the state power
to maximize personal economic gains by Menem’s advisers and followers. Deregulation
and privatization created unprecedented opportunities for holders of state power to
abuse” (Pang 2001: 104). The opening of the economy, which included selling off
massive state-owned firms, created opportunities for government officials and their
business allies to use their position for personal profit. Evidence suggests that this form
of corruption was rampant throughout the Menem regime.
While Argentina’s story is one of increased and rampant corruption throughout
the Menem regime, Brazil’s corruption story of this period is somewhat different. As his
eventual impeachment hearing suggests, corruption was a problem for the Collor regime.
In short, it sapped his political capital, rendering coherent governance all but impossible.
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While there is no CPI data for the Collor regime, there is ample literature documenting
the corruption in Brazilian politics during his abbreviated term (Flynn 1993; Panizza
2000). The most prominent instance involves Collor’s campaign treasurer, Paolo Cesar
Farias. Collor enjoyed the best financed campaign in Brazilian history. After the election,
Collor put three of his brothers in “strategic places for money making.” “The name of the
game was to garner federal funds for public works projects and economic developments
projects for specific individuals and companies.” The result was a “facilitator, greaser,
and influence-peddling company” (Pang 2002: 138). Farias was convicted and sentenced
to seven years in prison. Collor’s role in the affair led to his eventual impeachment
hearings and early abandonment of the presidential office.
Franco thus inherited office due largely to the corruption of his predecessor.
Therefore, while CPI data is unavailable prior to 1995, Brazil’s perceived level of public
corruption must have been relatively high. The trajectory of Brazil’s CPI in the wake of
Franco’s term suggests that corruption declined during his two years as acting president.
This decline appeared to continue throughout the two Cardoso terms that followed.
Brazil’s CPI score improved from 2.7 to 3.9 over that time, though it did backslide in
Cardoso’s second term (Figure 4.12). As previously mentioned, politics had disintegrated
into favor-swapping clientelism between the executive and legislative branch by the time
Cardoso had entered office. While Cardoso failed to eradicate the swapping of favors, the
data clearly suggests that corruption was improved upon during his two terms.
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Development Strategy
This period in both Argentina and Brazil was characterized by a significant shift
toward the neoliberal economic development model. While the Argentine economy was
slightly more closed than Brazil’s in 1989, by 2000, both countries had opened their
economies significantly.
In Argentina, despite running on a Peronist, populist platform, Menem undeniably
undertook a dramatic liberalization of the Argentine economy. Argentina’s IADB
Structural Reform Index score rose from 0.41 in 1989 to 0.5 in 1990. By the end of
Menem’s reign in 2000, Argentina scored a 0.63 (Figure 4.13). In Brazil, Collor’s
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presidency coincided with a continued liberalization of Brazil’s economy. Brazil’s IADB
structural reform index score increased from 0.43 to 0.51 in just three years. Franco saw
Brazil’s score increase slightly to 0.52 while completing Collor’s term, and Cardoso
oversaw an increase to 0.62 over his two terms (Figure 4.14).

65

While some argue that Menem concealed his neoliberal objectives whilst
campaigning (Pang 2001; Kingstone 2011), it may be more accurate to argue that Menem
underwent a genuine philosophical shift right. “As governor of the Province of Rioja
(1983-80), Menem ruled like a typical Latin American populist caudillo (Corrales 2002:
92). This change could thus be viewed as part of a general shift toward neoliberal
development in the region or a genuine response to what could be seen as a collapse of
the ISI development model and ensuing economic crisis. Even Domingo Felipe Cavallo,
Menem’s key economic adviser and staunch proponent of neoliberal economics, was not
always so open to neoliberal economics. “It is worth mentioning that the doctoral
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dissertation of Cavallo severely attacked monetarism. Cavallo predicted that monetarism
would fail in Latin America” (Pang 2001: 107).
Whatever the reasons, Argentina indeed underwent a severe liberalization during
the 1990s. This economic opening was perhaps the most drastic shift from extreme
statism and populism to extremely conservative reforms in all of Latin America (Pang
2001). Menem’s reforms were generally more timid and slow with regard to labor than
privatization, and social spending stayed roughly the same during this period. This is
likely due to the legacy of a relatively strong labor movement in the country.
In Brazil, the literature suggests a strict adherence to the principles of the
Washington Consensus: trade liberalization, financial liberalization, and privatization
(Nassif and Feijo, 2013). Collor’s term was not merely one of economic liberalization,
but “marked the beginning of a trend towards the hegemony of finance in the economy
and, consequently, in the state” (Bin 2014: 433). This is known as a period of
financialization in which “short-term financial valorization dominates the rest of the
economy, so that the decision-making criteria of the main financial agents and markets
takes priority over production activities and defines investment and consumption
decisions” (Medialdea 2013: 427). This economic financialization is argued to have led
to Brazil’s “poverty trap” between 1993 and 2003. Brazil’s liberalization continued
through the abbreviated tenure of Franco as well as through the two terms of Cardoso,
who “put finance at the top of the list of beneficiaries from the state’s transfer payments
(Bin 2014: 444). This continued Brazil’s financialization. In 1998, Cardoso reached a
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deal with the IMF for $41.5 billion. Such a deal implies Cardoso’s adherence to the
Washington Consensus and the neoliberal development model.

Income Distribution
How did this decade of democratic deepening and economic liberalization affect
the functional income distribution in Argentina and Brazil? The data compiled for this
thesis suggest a stark divergence in the trajectory of income distributions between
Argentina and Brazil during this period. Unfortunately, reliable employment data is only
available from 1993 onward for Argentina and 1992 onward for Brazil. However, the
available data shows a net decrease in LS4 from 50.86 to 46.13 percent in Argentina and
a net increase from 43.02 to 56.90 percent in Brazil during this period (Figures 4.15).
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The data for Argentina suggests a turning point between 1996 and 1997 in which
LS began to climb for the remainder of Menem’s second term (and for the following
year). This could have two possible causes: one external and one internal. First,
Mexico’s “Tequila Crisis” of 1995 seemed to have the regional effect of capital flight.
Capital fleeing Argentina left labor’s share of national income larger relative to that of
capital. This type of improvement does not help the laboring class in absolute terms. The
second potential cause of an increase in LS was a sort of crisis of democracy--the “re-reelection crisis.”
After being re-elected in 1995, Menem began an attempt to alter Argentina’s
constitution to allow him to serve a third term. 80 percent of the Argentine people
disapproved such a change and the backlash against Menem’s plan to extend his rule
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arguably put Argentina’s democracy in jeopardy (Corrales 2002: 215). This attempt by
Menem led to a severe loss of political capital which caused his economic reforms to
slow and their accomplishments to deteriorate. Menem’s political overreach hurt his
relationship with congress and created a “credibility deficit” which could have
contributed causally to failed attempts at economic reform. To the extent that liberal
economic reform in poor countries tends to disproportionately benefit capital and
contribute to inequality, deterioration of such reforms should disproportionately harm
capital and therefore inadvertently help income distribution. Therefore the slight rise in
LS over the second half of Menem’s second term may not have actually aided the
absolute position of Argentina’s impoverished population.
In fact, it is quite clear that throughout Menem’s two terms capital improved its
position relative to labor. Even the reduction of inflation between 1991 and 1994 was not
beneficial across the board. “Inflation does not disappear automatically, and becomes
even higher in some nontradables sectors. Within a few years, Buenos Aires became one
of the most expensive cities in the world (comparable to Frankfurt), while it's wage levels
lagged far behind (a third of Frankfurt levels)” (Corrales 2002: 193). The inflationary
crisis that brought Menem to power disproportionately hurt labor--the broader and more
poor segments of the population. The stabilization and boom of 1991 through 1994,
however, hardly reduced poverty at all. Stability and prosperity, to the extent that
Menem briefly delivered them, came unevenly. For instance, the automotive industry,
communications, and retail gained ground during Menem’s tenure. On the other hand,
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industries such as textiles and steel as well as transportation severely lost ground.
Prosperity brought an influx of people into the formal labor force. More people looking
for work, when combined with industrial reduction, led to increased unemployment.
As some would have predicted, the neoliberal economic reforms enacted by
Collor in Brazil would also benefit the population unevenly. Collor’s BEFIEX--an export
promotion law--”benefitted fewer than 50 companies in a country of 155 million people
and an economy of $180 billion in the 1970s and a $414 billion GDP in 1990. By
accident the program helped foreign corporations more than domestic firms” (Pang 2002:
128). The result of the Collor Plan in fact hurt labor considerably. The Plan pushed Brazil
into a deep recession including a large number of people losing their jobs. In Sao Paolo,
50,000 industrial workers were laid off. The minimum wage went down from $95 to $65
dollars per month. It seems that the middle class was hurt most by the Collor Plan.
Brazil’s implementation of neoliberal economic policies may have been successful at
controlling hyperinflation, but they would end up “contributing to increased
unemployment, informality, and constricting real wage growth” (Maia and Menezes
2014: 214). In short, The Collor Plan seems to have hurt Brazil’s functional income
distribution.
The effect of the Real Plan--put forth by the Franco regime--on income
distribution is unclear. LS data shows a significant increase in labor’s share of national
income between 1993 and 1995, with LS4 increasing from 41.43 percent to 47.50
percent. This represented the beginning of a rise in LS that would last through 1996. The
71

change in labor’s share of national income during Cardoso’s two terms is revealing. His
first year in office saw the continuation of a rise in LS4 from 47.5 percent to its peak of
56.9, where its three years of rapid gains ended abruptly and labor’s share of national
income stabilized through the rest of Cardoso’s time in office. It is during this time that
the financial sector separated itself from the rest of the population in terms of income
(Maia and Menezes 2014). “The outcomes of the neoliberal and financial changes in the
Brazilian economy since the Real Plan have been consistently unfavorable to the working
classes. The gap between the labor and capital shares of total output has considerably
widened in favor of the latter” (Bin 2014: 440). The value of financial assets increased
drastically (Maia and Menezes 2014).
The literature paints an even grimmer picture than the LS data suggests. Under
Cardoso, income inequality became significantly worse, situating Brazil below many
African countries at the time based on the ratio of income between the top 10 percent and
bottom 40 percent (Latin American Regional Reports: Brazil Report, 2001). The era is
characterized as a period of poor growth with stagnant employment in which productivity
increased at the expense of rising unemployment (Nassif and Feijo, 2013). Cardoso’s
term was one in which “financial rent-seeking had ‘hijacked’ an excessively high
proportion of income” (Maia and Menezes, 2014: 430). In contrast to those that view
Cardoso’s time as one in which Brazil reaped the rewards of globalization and the virtues
of the neoliberal economic development model, critics point to the status of lower
economic strata of the population. “Social instability, lack of civil liberty among the poor,
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police brutality, unequal income distribution, and the inability of congress and president
to effectively solve the problems will remain intractable beyond Cardoso’s term in
office” (Pang 2002: 145). While the country may have gotten richer as a whole, labor and
the poor were left behind in Brazil just as they were in Argentina.

The New Millennium and the New Left

On the surface, the 2000s have seen a political pivot leftward in the executive
branch of both Argentina and Brazil. However, each country took different routes to get
there. The political and economic climate of Argentina at the end of Menem’s second
term did not bode well for his party in the 1999 elections. “The uneven distribution of
income, the government’s inability to create jobs, and the perception that governmental
institutions and officials are corrupt increased popular frustration that came to a head in
the months of November and December [1999]” (Pang 2001: 120). This was the context
in which the elections were held that saw Fernando de la Rua of the Radical Civic Union
party (UCR) stifle Menem’s attempts to run for an unconstitutional third term. This was
the context in which only the second non-Peronist, non-PJ affiliated politician took the
executive office since 1972. Unfortunately, de la Rua’s presidency cannot be seen as
successful in light of the fact that he left office amid mass political and economic
turbulence in the wake of the Argentina’s 2001 economic collapse. De la Rua gave way
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to a revolving presidential door that would last until 2003. After winning a free, direct
election in which Carlos Menem ran strongly, but eventually forfeited, Nestor Kirchner
(PJ) assumed office seven months early. Kirchner opted not to run a second term with the
intent of extending his influence through his wife, Cristina Fernandez. As anticipated,
Fernandez de Kirchner won the 2007 election based heavily on the perceived success of
her husband in achieving political stability and economic recovery
(www.systemicpeace.org).
Conversely, Brazil’s alternation of the executive office occurred more smoothly
than that of Argentina during this period. The 2003 Brazilian election brought about a
leftward pivot--at least in rhetoric-- from the neoliberal model of Cardoso. After three
unsuccessful campaigns, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the left-leaning Workers’ Party
(PT), a former union organizer and one of the most popular Brazilian politicians of all
time, won the Presidential office. He would serve two successful terms with a relative
lack of turbulence.

Level of Democracy
As previously shown, the Polity IV index for Argentina and Brazil remained
steady at +8 throughout this period. The democracies of Argentina and Brazil can
therefore be seen as likely to be consolidated. However, both democratic regimes were
weak and arguably defective (Merkel 2004).
74

The crises in Argentina leading up to de la Rua’s reign “revealed the existence of
a profound crisis of legitimacy and democratic representation” (Carranza 2005: 76).
Despite a steady Polity IV score, there is evidence to suggest Argentina’s democracy was
unhealthy before and throughout de la Rua’s abbreviated term. In the October 2001 midterm elections for instance, 4 million people cast blank ballots. On December 19 and 20,
2001, there was a massive popular uprising leading to the resignation of the economic
minister, Cavallo. Unable to contain the economic crisis handed to him by the Menem
regime or the popular uprising in response to hyperinflation, de la Rua himself was
compelled to resign from office early in late December 2001. Following his early exit,
“protests and public pressure removed three interim presidents from office in less than a
month--Frederico Ramon Puerta, Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, and Eduardo Oscar Camano”
(Jouet 2998: 453). On January 2, 2002, congress chose Eduardo Duhalde (PJ), through a
constitutional process, to serve as interim president through what was supposed to be the
remainder of de La Rua’s term. However, Duhalde would not last the rest of the term. By
May 2003 public pressure compelled him to also step down early. Forced resignations
such as that of de la Rua and the revolving presidential door suggest that Argentina’s
democracy was not of a particularly high level at this time leading up to the Kirchner era.
In fact, Kirchner may have also had a negative effect on Argentine democracy.
“Even though Kirchner [was] not the oppressive autocrat that Peron was, he hindered the
progress of democratic transparency in Argentina by continuing to rely on political
clientelism to consolidate presidential power” (Jouet 2008: 458). In the tradition of Latin
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American hyperpresidentialism, Kirchner clientelistically concentrated power into his
own executive office.
Kirchner hurt Argentine democracy in several other ways. He tarnished judicial
independence, not by bribes, threats, and stacking the courts as Menem did (Walker
2006), but by stacking the Council of the Magistrature, which selects and demotes the
Supreme Court justices (Jouet 2008: 459). It is also clear that Kirchner planned to
circumvent term limits. Instead of running for a second term, Kirchner had his wife,
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, run in the 2007 elections. If she were to capitalize on his
popularity and win, then he could wield influence throughout her term and run for a
second, non-consecutive term himself. This would have led to a twelve year Kirchner
dynasty in Argentine politics. Unfortunately for the Kirchners, Nestor died suddenly of a
heart attack at age 60 during Cristina’s first term in office.
Brazil’s democracy at the turn of the millennium can also be seen as consolidated,
yet defective (Merkel 2004). However, there is less evidence in the literature of
democratic weakness within Lula’s regime than that of the Kirchners.
Lula could attribute his success in the 2003 election to a failure of his
predecessor. Cardoso’s shift in public expenditure from a broad, middle-class focus to
specifically targeting the poor in accordance with Washington Consensus principles led
to the middle class shifting its votes to socialist candidates such as Lula (Wogart 2010:
396). The ability of the public to hold Cardoso’s PSDB party accountable for this shift in
focus, to sanction undesired political behavior, is evidence of a healthy democracy.
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Democratic dynamics may have brought Lula into office in response to Cardoso’s
perceived abandonment of the middle class, but the economic environment rendered him
unable to deliver strongly on his populist, anti-finance campaign platform. During the
campaign a crisis of confidence emerged in the financial sector, which saw Lula as a
leftist who may have been willing to break contracts and violate property rights. This led
to capital flight and a depreciation of the Real. In response, and against the mandate
given to him by the people, Lula committed to keeping intact Cardoso’s neoliberal
macroeconomic policies of inflation targets, floating exchange rates, and primary fiscal
surplus targets (Wogart 2010). In a sense, the financialization and liberalization of the
Brazilian economy mitigated Lula’s ability to deliver on his campaign platform.

Political Performance
The degree of governance and change thereof differed between Argentina and
Brazil during this period. In Argentina, Menem left office with a very low RPE score of
0.729. De la Rua and the four subsequent Argentine presidents failed to improve the
government’s performance in a significant way. When Kirchner took office in 2003,
Argentina’s RPE score was 0.739. By 2008, it had reached 1.164. This was an increase of
58 percent, which brought Argentina back above the global average in this measure
political capacity (Figure 4.16). While RPE data only extends to 2011, it appears as
though Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner oversaw a slight and continued increase in
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political performance. In contrast, when Lula took power in Brazil in 2002, the country’s
political capacity of 1.370 was already significantly greater than that of Argentina.
Throughout Lula’s two terms as president, Brazil’s political capacity remained high with
no discernable trend (Figure 4.17).
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Corruption
While Argentina and Brazil both experienced high levels of corruption in line
with the rest of Latin America at the time, Brazil was consistently less corrupt than
Argentina during this period (Figure 4.18).
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In Argentina, Menem left office with a high level of perceived public corruption
represented by a CPI score of 3.5. During the abbreviated tenure of de la Rua and
subsequent revolving presidential door period, Argentina’s CPI score decreased to 2.5
representing a 29 percent increase in perceived corruption according to the index despite
the fact that de la Rua campaigned on wiping out the corruption of the Menem regime.
This is unsurprising given the public uproar throughout his abbreviated term and beyond.
Corruption in the de la Rua regime also harmed policy implementation. For instance,
congress approved labor reform in May of 2000, but a corruption scandal in which Vice
President Carlos Alvarez was forced to resign served to weaken government to the point
of being unable to implement the reforms (Carranza 2005: 70).
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The terms of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner coincided with
a decrease in corruption. In 2003, Argentina’s CPI score was 2.5. By 2008 it rose to 2.9,
representing a decrease in corruption of 0.4 units. However, “several corruption scandals
suggest that the Kirchner administration did not refrain from bribery in order to solidify
its grip on Argentine society and enrich itself” (Jouet 2008: 459). Among such scandals
include the accusation of bribery by a Swedish gas pipeline company as well as an
incident in which $64 thousand in cash was found in the bathroom of the Minister of the
Economy. Old habits die hard. Argentina’s history of corrupt public officials is no
exception.
When Fernandez de Kirchner took office, Argentina’s CPI score was 2.9. While
the trend appears to have been toward a decrease in the perception of public corruption
since then, Transparency International altered its methodology in 2012 (mostly by scaling
up by a factor of 10), possibly making data prior to that year incomparable to data since
(Figure 4.11). Nevertheless, in 2004, Argentina scored a 34 out of a possible 100, earning
it a rank of 107th out of 175 countries indexed. Transparency International (2014)
suggests that, despite the presence of institutions tasked with fighting corruption, there
are gaps between anti-corruption laws and their actual enforcement. These gaps are
argued to be among the greatest “corruption risks.” Transparency International also
argues that there is a lack of transparency in campaign financing and that the judiciary
suffers from political influence--a consistent problem throughout Argentina’s history.
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While the perception of public corruption was consistently lower during the Lula
regime than that of the Kirchner regimes, it was not absent during the Lula era. In fact, it
is during Lula’s first term that Brazil’s CPI score plummeted more sharply than any
period before or after. Lula’s second term ushered in a decrease in the perception of
public corruption which would persist through the latest available data (Figure 4.18). It is
unclear what sparked this change of course, but the data seems to suggest that the
increase in perceived corruption was a remnant of the Cardoso regime and that Lula in
fact help to cause the rebound and sustained decrease which appears to have begun in
2006.

Development Strategy
Both the Kirchner and Lula regimes could be seen as a pivot, at least in rhetoric,
away from the neoliberal Washington Consensus and toward a new Left with regard to
economics. However, while each executive campaigned on relatively left-leaning
economic platforms, neither regime actually represents a retrenchment from the two prior
decades of economic liberalization.
Kirchner’s economic strategy is referred to in the literature as “neodesarrollismo”
or neo-developmentalism (Wylde 2011). It was a sort of open-economy nationalism that
incorporated neoliberal elements as well as a strong dose of nationalism and statism. It
was a shift from, and likely a reaction to, the perceived effects of Menem and de La
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Rua’s relatively pure neoliberal policy aims. However, Kirchnerism maintained “a
practical acceptance of some of the policies and principles associated with neoliberalism”
(Wylde 2011: 439). Specifically, it maintained the neoliberal welfare model of social
safety nets geared toward minimizing the harshest poverty and indigence. This is in
contrast with classic Peronism, in which clientelism was directed toward the poor and
working class as a whole.
Lula, a former labor organizer and member of the left-leaning Workers’ Party,
represents a shift in Brazilian political economy. However, that shift was perhaps not as
significant as Lula or those that voted him into office may have preferred. “Despite the
traditional (leftist) anti-creditor rhetoric of Lula’s Workers’ Party, his presidency marked
a deepened Brazilian commitment to paying the interest on its public debt” (Bin 2014:
438). This contradiction between populist rhetoric and at least partial adherence to the
Washington Consensus is reminiscent of Menem’s ideological shift after being elected.
Nevertheless, in the face of a neoliberal and financialized climate, Lula did make
efforts at controlling the economy, leading to what was arguably the first modern
Brazilian regime with such contradictory features. “Even under the neo-liberal
macroeconomic agenda, there was an attempt to restore an agenda of industrial and
technological policy” (Nassif 2013: 566). Indeed, while the IADB structural reform index
score for Brazil rose from 0.62 to 0.66 by 2008, it remained there through the remainder
of available data (Figure 4.19).
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While Kirchnerism treated welfare in the neoliberal fashion, it differed starkly
from both Menem’s neoliberal agenda and the classic Peronist ISI developmental model.
Unlike the hands-off approach to trade encouraged by the neoliberal model, Kirchner
pursued an active industrial policy, protected infant industries and very much played an
active role in the market and prices. Unlike the Peronist development model, Kirchner’s
economic policies promoted export in a similar way to the Asian Tiger economies.
Kirchner’s regime can also be seen as neo-corporatist, in contrast to Peron’s, in the way
that it more genuinely incorporated the business community’s interests and voice in its
policy formation (Wylde 2011). As a result, Argentina’s IADB Structural Reform Index
score rose slightly from 0.62 to 0.65 during the course of Kirchner’s reign (Figure 4.20).
In sum, while both Kirchner and Lula are seen as part of the new Left of Latin America,
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it is clear that both presidents oversaw the continued liberalization of their respective
economies over their two term tenures.

Income Distribution
Both Lula and Kirchner oversaw an increase in labor’s share of national income
and therefore an improvement in economic inequality. However, their economies were in
vastly different situations when each took power. Whereas Lula took over after Cardoso’s
two relatively calm terms in office, Kirchner took the executive office following years of
massive economic and political turbulence. It is also unclear whether the gains that
85

Kirchner and Lula made were sufficient relative to the high levels of poverty and
inequality that each faced and the efforts that each put in.
When de la Rua took power from Menem in 2000, Argentina was in a period of
hyperinflation culminating in a $100 billion default combined with corruption, poor
political performance, and a neoliberal reform agenda which hurt income distribution,
decreased labor’s share of national income, and caused great suffering among much of
Argentina’s population. Argentina’s LS4 was 46.13 percent in 2000. After peaking at
47.82 percent in 2001, LS4 plummeted sharply to 37.63 percent by 2002. In other words,
labor lost more than one fifth of its share of national income in just one year. By 2003
labor’s share of national income was at an all-time low. When de la Rua left office,
fifteen million out of Argentina’s thirty-seven million people lived in poverty (Jouet
2008: 450).
By the time that Kirchner took office, LS4 had reached an all-time low of 37.63
percent. Kirchner’s export-driven approach to economic development with a focus on
industry over banking and capital markets led to a significant increase in functional
income equality. In 2003, LS4 was at 37.0 percent. By 2006--the last year for which this
data is available--LS4 had increased to 44.3 percent and appeared poised to continue its
ascent (Figure 4.21).
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It is not a stretch to argue that the reign of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner can be
viewed as an extension of her husband’s policies. While there is no data on LS beyond
2007, Argentina’s GINI index score had steadily decreased from 2000 through at least
2011, while the percent of national income earned by the bottom 60 percent of workers
steadily increased (World Bank). Therefore, it is safe to say that the piece of the
economic pie distributed to labor has increased relative to that of capital throughout the
Fernandez de Kirchner regime just as it did during Nestor Kirchner’s term.
On the surface, this movement toward a more equitable income distribution would
be predicted to have alleviated the developmental suffering of the Argentine masses.
Unfortunately, however, poverty remained high and inequality actually increased
between 2003 and 2007 (Jouet 2008: 454; Wylde 2011: 240). The gains achieved by the
Argentine people can arguably be attributed to the economic recovery rather than
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addressing the poverty and inequality created by the neoliberal policies of the 1990s.
Nevertheless, the poverty and inequality that runs rampant throughout Latin America was
not tackled by the Kirchner regime. “Inequalities increased or simply stayed the same
depending on the sector, and the structures of socio-economic power stayed in place.
Therefore Kirchner has not distributed property, income, or power--except among
different segments of the capitalist class” (Wolfe 2011: 446).
In Brazil, Lula oversaw a definite increase in Labor’s share of national income.
LS4 increased from 52.8 percent in 2003 to 54.9 percent by 2007. LS1--a more
rudimentary calculation, but one with data extending to 2009--shows a continued increase
in labor’s share through Lula’s second term (Figure 4.22).
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The 2000s saw a fast increase in wages and decrease in unemployment in Brazil
(Maia and Menezes, 2014). Of those gains, agriculture was the most dynamic sector,
whereas urban industrial workers’ plight improved more slightly (Wogart 2010). Critics
argue that Lula’s effects on income inequality were small given the massive effort of
Bolsa Familia and the increasing education and job opportunities in the recently stable
economic environment (Wogart 2010). They argue that since 2005 real wages have
grown faster than labor productivity due in part to a decreased supply of skilled labor
force (Maia and Menezes 2014). Nevertheless, socioeconomic inequality remains stark
despite modest improvements. Brazil is still among the most unequal societies in the
region (Kingstone 2011; Wogart 2010). Like the Kirchner’s, Lula’s two terms as Brazil’s
president--despite showing some progress--seem not to have been the panacea to starkly
unequal income distribution.

Analysis
What do these findings suggest regarding the relationship between
democratization and functional income distribution in Argentina and Brazil? Two
decades have passed since Argentina and Brazil transitioned to democracy. Neither
transition seems to have been immediately followed by an improvement in income
inequality. Nor has the inequality been alleviated on a whole in the two decades since. In
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fact, there is no evidence of labor gaining relative to capital in either country until at least
the third democratic president’s tenure5.
One might expect, as discussed in the previous chapters, that democratization
would make policymakers more accountable to labor because labor makes up the
broadest segment of the population. This increased public accountability would thereby
increase labor’s share in national income. “On a whole, however, democracy...has
brought about less reallocation of resources than one might expect” (Hunter and
Sugiyama, 2009: 40). Democracy may have improved the welfare of large segments of
the poorest members of Argentina and Brazil, but seldom at the cost of finance and
capital.
While LS has increased steadily in each country since 2004, income distribution
in Argentina and Brazil had followed divergent paths in the prior decades (Figure 4.23).
Perhaps the most important period to this research is from 1993 to 1996. Figure 4.23
illustrates that this period was one in which LS in Argentina declined while LS in Brazil
increased rapidly. What caused these two neighboring countries to experience such
opposite changes to income distribution?

5

Kirchner in Argentina, Franco in Brazil.
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First, Brazil was more democratic than Argentina during this period as well as in
the years prior. Brazil maintained a +8 on the Polity IV index from 1988 onward,
whereas Argentina dipped to +7 from 1989 to 1998 (Figure 4.1). The Polity IV threshold
for the category of “democracy” is +6 and above, and Argentina therefore never lost its
status as a democracy. However, this index suggests that during this period Brazil was
more democratic than Argentina. This fact lends some support for the hypothesis
presented in the previous chapter--that there is a positive, causal relationship between
level of democracy and labor’s share of national income.
Second, Brazil’s political performance scored much higher than Argentina’s.
Argentina’s RPE score took a major hit from 1992 to 1993 corresponding with Menem’s
run for re-election amid rampant corruption. In contrast, Brazil enjoyed a higher RPE
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score than Argentina, which was also on the rise from 1992 to 1995. Theoretically, a
government with a higher political capacity should be more able to implement whichever
social or economic policies it chooses. Therefore, all else equal it makes sense that
Brazil’s income distribution improved relative to that of Argentina during a period in
which it outperformed Argentina politically.
The third factor of apparent significance is corruption. As previously stated,
Menem’s regime was plagued by corruption, perhaps more than any other regime
covered in this research. CPI scores for Argentina and Brazil in the period leading up to
1993 reveal a rapid rise in corruption in Argentina while Brazil’s corruption decreased.
Clientelism, the form of corruption endemic to the Menem government, tends to divert
government funds and shape the political and economic landscape in a way that favors
the few at the expense of society at large. Therefore, corruption is a likely causal factor in
the differing LS trajectories of Argentina and Brazil from 1993 to 1996.
The effect of development strategy on functional income distribution seems less
clear. In 1989, Brazil’s IADB structural reform index score was, for the first time, higher
than that of Argentina. However, from 1989 to 1993, Argentina opened its economy at a
significantly faster rate than Brazil. In fact, this was perhaps the most extreme period of
economic liberalization in the entire region (Pang 2001). To those that argue Washington
Consensus based reforms contribute to income inequality, it comes as no surprise that
Menem’s extreme neoliberal pivot preceded the major decline in LS. However, Brazil
also underwent economic liberalization in the years leading up to this period. Also, from
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1993 to 1996, both countries liberalized at identical rates. This suggests that economic
liberalization may not, by itself, have a significant, direct impact on functional income
distribution.
The respective functional income distributions of Argentina and Brazil also
differed in trajectory from 1996 to 2001. During this period Argentina’s LS4 increased
from 43.1 to 47.8 percent, whereas Brazil’s LS4 decreased from 56.9 to 54.7 percent
(figure 4.23). Both countries’ income distributions reversed course from the previous
period. Similar patterns emerge. Argentina’s Polity IV index score increased from +7 to
+8 from 1998 to 1999. Argentina’s increase in its level of democracy during this period
corresponds with a positive change in course of its functional income distribution.
The relationship between political performance and functional income distribution
is unclear when comparing the change in RPE scores to the change in LS4 from 1996 to
2001. Argentina increased its RPE from 0.66 to 0.75 during this period, corresponding
with an increase in LS4 from 43.1 to 47.8 percent as expected. But surprisingly, Brazil’s
RPE score increased much more significantly, from 0.94 to 1.27, while its LS4 actually
decreased from 56.9 to 54.7 percent. This may seem to suggest a negative or insignificant
correlation between RPE and LS4. However, if RPE were related causally to LS4, one
would expect to see the effects on income distribution to lag slightly behind changes in
political capacity. Indeed, when comparing the graphs of RPE and LS4 for these two
periods, a striking pattern emerges (Figure 4.24). It becomes clear that changes in the
trajectory of RPE consistently precede the major changes in LS4 by roughly two years.
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This suggests that political capacity positively affects functional income equality. Also,
while the trajectories of RPE and LS tend to correspond, when comparing Argentina and
Brazil’s positions relative to each other, the pattern is even clearer. Argentina enjoyed
higher political performance than Brazil from 1990 to 1993 and a more equitable
functional income distribution than Brazil until 1995. In 1994, the RPE score gap
between Argentina and Brazil was at its widest. This corresponds with the widest gap
between LS4 two years later.

94

The position of Argentina relative to Brazil with regard to RPE is predictive of
their relative positions regarding LS4 roughly two years later. This relationship appears
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more significant and consistent than the relationship between democracy and income
distribution when considering the data presented in this research. Brazil’s authoritarian
era was characterized as one of upward mobility. Menem’s regime increased Argentina’s
level of democracy, but saw an increase in functional income inequality. Both Argentina
and Brazil have consolidated democracies, yet neither have seen a significant net increase
in Labor’s share of national income over the past two decades. Perhaps this is due to the
mediocre or defective qualities of the Brazilian and Argentine democracies as
demonstrated by the fact that neither has been able to increase their Polity IV index score
above +8. In fact, the literature suggests that as of 2002, both Argentina and Brazil could
be categorized as defective democracies (Merkel 2004). Argentina is arguably a
“Delegative democracy,” whereas Brazil is an “Exclusive, Illiberal Democracy.”
Nevertheless, the level of democracy as operationalized in this research appears to have a
less consistent impact on functional income distribution than does political performance.
Unlike RPE, corruption appears to follow rather than lead the path of LS. For
example, Brazil’s LS4 peaked at 57 percent in 1996, followed by a peak in Brazil’s CPI
score at 4.1 three years later. By 2004, Brazil’s LS reached a low of 52 percent before
increasing gradually to the present. This was followed two years later by Brazil’s CPI
score, which reached a low of 3.3 in 2006 before also increasing gradually to the present
(Figure 4.25). Argentina’s LS4 and CPI scores show a similar pattern. This refutes the
argument that corruption is a causal factor in income inequality. Rather, it seems to
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suggest that--if there is a causal relationship--income inequality may be a causal factor in
corruption.
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This chapter presented qualitative data and descriptive statistics for each
presidency in Argentina and Brazil since their most recent bouts with authoritarianism in
an attempt to answer whether democracy improves functional income distribution in
developing countries. It found little evidence to support this hypothesis. The direct effects
of development strategy on functional income distribution are unclear given that there has
never been a meaningful retrenchment from the process of economic opening in either
country, though Lula and the Kirchners were the most populist rhetorically and their
terms coincided with the increasing equality. Perhaps the most significant finding was
what appears to be a causal relationship between political performance and functional
income distribution: the former seems to predict the latter. It is therefore likely that the
degree of governance or political capacity has a greater effect on equitable development
than does the type of governing body. The concluding chapter will discuss limitations,
policy implications, and areas for further research.
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Chapter - 5
Conclusion
This thesis attempted to contribute to the existing literature on democratization,
political performance, and economic development by examining Argentina and Brazil
from their most recent bouts with authoritarianism to the present. For this purpose, it
compared several dynamic indices including the Polity IV index, Relative Political
Extraction, the Corruption Perception Index, and the Inter-American Development
Bank’s Structural Reform Index. It also used data from the International Labor
Organization’s Yearbook of Labor Statistics and the United Nations National Accounts
Statistics to chart the functional income distribution from each country during the period
in question. Its aim was to assess whether it was democratization or political capacity that
affected the shape of development in the two countries in question. In the end, this thesis
failed to find evidence to confirm that democratization caused a more equitable
functional income distribution. The findings do suggest, however, that functional income
distribution is affected by political performance.
The first pair of hypotheses pertained to the specific effect of an increase in the
level of democracy—as measured by the Polity IV index—on labor’s share of national
income in Argentina and Brazil. This research did not find sufficient evidence to accept
the hypothesis that an increase in the level of democracy positively affects LS. Reliable,
quantitative data on LS is unavailable for the authoritarian periods and periods of
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. For the period in which LS data is
available, the trajectory of LS in Argentina and Brazil differ despite the fact that their
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Polity IV scores are equal for most of that time. Taking the whole period studied in this
research as a whole, neither country seems to have improved functional income
inequality despite transitioning to and consolidating their democracies.
The second pair of hypotheses pertained to the effect of political performance—as
measured by RPE—on labor’s share of national income. This research confirms a
positive effect of political performance on LS. During the period examined in this
research, changes in RPE appear to predict changes in the trajectory of LS by roughly
two years (Figure 4.24). Improvement of political capacity precedes increase in labor’s
share of national income, whereas deterioration of political capacity leads to a decrease in
labor’s share. This research therefore confirms the hypothesis that political capacity has
been a causal factor in the functional income equality of Argentina and Brazil.
There were two main limitations to this study. The first has to do with the
measure of democracy. As explained previously, Polity IV is a relatively minimalist
measure of democracy which focuses on the executive branch of government and
provides a single score meant to encapsulate the degree of democracy or
authoritarianism. For most of the period in question, both countries had the same index
score and fit into the same regime category as one another. This makes it difficult to
contrast the quality of democracy between the two cases or over time. Given that
Argentina and Brazil remained in the category of “democracy” from the time of transition
onward according to the Polity Project, this index did not highlight meaningful change
over time or nuance in the quality of democracy for the period being studied. A
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multidimensional or more nuanced operationalization of democracy could benefit this
research.
The second significant limitation to this research was the dearth of quality data.
This is an issue for many underdeveloped countries as well as authoritarian regimes.
Simply put, poor states and authoritarian governments seem to provide relatively less
complete and less accurate data than do wealthy democracies. This was particularly true
of labor and employment statistics, which were only available back to 1992, but was also
true of the Corruption Perception Index, which only reached back to 1995.
This research has several policy implications. If it is true, as this study suggests,
that political capacity is a causal factor affecting functional income inequality, then
efforts to strengthen political institutions and political performance should take primacy
over efforts to shore up procedural democracy alone. As de Soto (2000) suggests, a focus
on improving property rights and the rule of law would be significant steps toward
alleviating poverty and inequality in Argentina and Brazil. In an effort to enhance
political capacity, the governments of Argentina and Brazil should make efforts to reach
rural and agricultural areas and to incorporate or reduce the informal economy. These
efforts should increase political reach and extraction, two components of Relative
Political Capacity.
Another policy implication of this research has to do with the model of
development that Argentina and Brazil follow. As this research suggests, the neoliberal
development model and Washington Consensus failed to prevent economic crisis in
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Argentina and Brazil. This model of development is also argued to increase
unemployment and focus on growth and stability of the economy as a whole rather than
the plight of the large, poor segment of the working population. Indeed, while no regime
studied in this thesis went against the tide of economic liberalization, the regime that
corresponded with the most extreme economic opening also suffered from a significant
decrease in labor’s share of national income6. If it is true, as the literature suggests, that
poverty and inequality hinder growth and development, then perhaps Argentina and
Brazil should consider abandoning or altering their adherence to the Washington
Consensus.
This thesis has revealed several areas for further research on the relationship
between democratization, political performance, and equitable development. First, as
previously stated, the reliance on the Polity IV index to examine the level of democracy
in this research lead to a relatively minimalist and executive-oriented understanding of
each regime. Further research should consider alternative measures of democracy. As
Merkel (2004) points out, simply having free and fair elections is not the same as having
a genuine, “embedded” democracy. It is possible that neither Argentina nor Brazil have
ever achieved such status, making it difficult to draw a meaningful conclusion with
regard to the relationship between democracy and income distribution. Future research
would be well served to delve more deeply into the true nature of each supposedly

6

The Menem Presidency in Argentina oversaw the most rapid increase in the IADB Structural
Reform Index (0.41 to 0.63) and also a significant decrease in LS4 (Figure 4.15).
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democratic regime. Such analysis could include World Values Survey data regarding
popular preferences for a democratic political system versus the appeal for a strong leader
who does not have to bother with a legislative body or elections. Such value preferences
would speak to the quality of democracy better than a single index could. It could be
possible that there is a stronger relationship between embedded democracy and equitable
income distribution than this research was able to unearth.
Another potentially fruitful area of further research would be to test on a larger
scale the positive relationship that this study found between political performance and
income equality. A large-N, empirically driven analysis could either strengthen or refute
the findings of this research, which suggest the degree of governance positively affects an
equitable income distribution.
In sum, this work suggests that in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, political
performance is a strong determinant of the distribution of income regardless of the type
of regime or level of democracy. To the extent that poverty and inequality are endemic to
Latin America and cause a great deal of suffering, it is important to make efforts to
improve the capability of governments throughout the region.
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